Separate Space and Shared Space in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Anthony Lemon
Oxford University*

Apartheid represented an ambitious but doomed attempt to remould South Africa’s human geography. Attempts to reform the system but preserve white control in the 1980s were the precursor of fundamental political and constitutional change in the early 1990s. Change in the social and economic spheres is fundamentally constrained by the apartheid heritage. This is explored here in relation to two key spatial issues: sharing the land and sharing the cities. The context and problems of sharing the land are considered, paying particular attention to local complexity and community participation. Post-apartheid policies and legislation concerning the ‘three Rs’—restitution, redistribution and reform of land tenure—are described and assessed in relation to their intended aims of social justice, the alleviation of poverty, national reconciliation and economic growth. The sharing of urban space is similarly constrained by the apartheid heritage, especially the effects of legally imposed racial segregation and racially discriminatory influx controls. Issues considered here include the extent, patterns and consequences of residential desegregation, and the influence of planning policies including land zoning and acquisition on urbanization, informal settlement and the spatial form of the post-apartheid city. The government’s response to these problems, including its Urban Development Strategy, is discussed.

Keywords: Apartheid, land reform, restitution, land tenure, desegregation, urbanization, urban development.

SEPARATE SPACE: APARTHEID AS (MIS)APPLIED GEOGRAPHY

Apartheid represented an ambitious but doomed attempt to remould the social, political and economic geography of South Africa (Lemon, 1976, 1987; Smith, 1982). Ostensibly intended to minimize friction between peoples regarded as incompatible, apartheid was intended to provide a philosophically justifiable rationale for a system which would entrench white power and economic privilege in the core areas of the South African space economy, including commercial farming areas. It sought to create separate social and political spaces for white, black, colored (mixed-race) and Indian South Africans at three spatial scales: the micro-scale of facilities and amenities, or ‘petty apartheid’, the meso-scale of urban residential and commercial segregation, and the macro-scale of national government or ‘grand apartheid’ (Christopher, 1994).

* School of Geography, Oxford University, Mansfield College, Oxford, OX1 3TF, U.K.

Geography Research Forum • Vol. 18 • 1998:1-21
Practicalities dictated that the official fourfold racial classification of the population was only imposed at the meso-scale, principally through the Group Areas Acts of 1950 and 1966. ‘Petty apartheid’ normally distinguished only between whites and ‘non-whites’, whilst macro-scale apartheid created ten ‘homelands’ or bantustans for blacks but found no spatial solution for the highly urbanized Indian and colored groups. It resorted instead to the policy of ‘parallelism’ which created colored and Indian political institutions responsible for running purely domestic affairs of coloreds and Indians within the framework of ‘separate development’ (Rhoodie, 1973; Lemon, 1987:265–7). It did, however, seek to restrict the inter-provincial movement of Indians until 1975, and to exclude Indians altogether from the Orange Free State until 1985, whilst preference was given to colored over black labor in the Western Cape between 1962 and 1985. Parallelism reached its logical(?) conclusion in the 1984 constitution which created a tricameral parliament with separate houses responsible for the ‘own affairs’ of Indians, coloreds and whites. Blacks who constituted nearly three-quarters of South Africa’s population were excluded, as they were regarded as citizens of the homelands or ‘national states’, four of which—Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei—were officially ‘independent’ by 1981.

The dilemma of ‘parallelism’ symbolized the larger problem of increasing economic integration and urbanization which haunted the apartheid project from the start. State attempts to reverse these processes through ‘influx control’ of blacks caused much misery but ultimately failed, leaving large numbers of ‘illegals’ in the cities and displacing much black urbanization across homeland boundaries, leading to spatially dispersed apartheid cities which pushed the poor to the periphery, forced to become ‘frontier commuters’ to distant jobs (Lemon, 1982). More than five million black ‘insiders’ retained legal rights to reside in the cities (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). In the homelands, overcrowding was increased both by population growth and forced resettlement from ‘white’ towns and farms. Remittances from migrant laborers were much more important than agriculture in sustaining families at low levels of living (Cobbett, 1987). From the 1960s onwards, however, the transition to monopoly capitalism led to the adoption of more capital-intensive production techniques using a smaller labor force of semi-skilled and skilled black workers, whilst economic stagnation from the mid-1970s also reduced demand for labor (Keenan, 1984; Pickles, 1991). In these conditions the homelands largely ceased to function as labor reserves, and became dumping grounds for surplus blacks. Forced resettlement from urban areas and from rural ‘black spots’ which contradicted the apartheid map were perhaps the most widely publicized aspects, but attempts to eliminate various forms of labor tenancy were more significant numerically, probably affecting at least 2 million people between the 1950s and the 1980s (Platzky and Walker, 1985), whilst many more black laborers on white farms fell victim to mechanization. The state attempted through industrial decentralization to change the distribution of economic activity so as to underpin its desired racial distribution of population, but even with some of the most generous incentives in the world in the 1980s its success was very limited (Wellings and Black, 1986; Maasdorp, 1990).
Official modification of the apartheid spatial system characterized the ‘reform’ years in the mid- and late 1980s, in the misguided belief that the essence of the system could be preserved with a degree of acquiescence from those blacks benefiting materially from visible changes in township services and infrastructure, housing, and education (Lemon, 1995). Racially discriminatory influx control was abolished in 1986, although attempts to guide and channel black movement continued (Mabin, 1989). Industrial decentralization incentives were reformulated on less overtly political lines in 1991 (Black and Roux, 1991). Within the cities, market pressures began to undermine legally imposed residential segregation, leading to the emergence of ‘grey areas’ in some legally white neighborhoods. Legal recognition of a few ‘Free Settlement Areas’ in 1988 was accompanied by futile attempts to hold the line everywhere else (Lemon, 1991). Total repeal of Group Areas legislation soon followed in 1991. The emergence of racially mixed residential areas led to pressure for educational desegregation which received only a cautious official response in the early 1990s, when other aspects of the system were being dismantled, revealing a continuing determination to preserve white privilege (Lemon, 1994). Repeal of the Land Acts in 1991 removed restrictions on black purchase of white land, but in itself offered no radical change as little de facto redistribution is likely to occur through purely market mechanisms.

Most of the legislation underpinning the apartheid spatial system (including its keystone, racial classification) had thus been dismantled prior to the formal ending of apartheid as a political system in 1994. The reincorporation of the homelands soon followed, reuniting South African political space. The critical question for political geographers is the extent to which these essentially political and legislative measures will lead to a genuine sharing of social and economic space in post-apartheid South Africa. Can a separation which was politically imposed be politically dismantled, or will the process of change merely continue that fueled by economic forces in the 1980s?

In the short term the effectiveness of political action is weakened by the administrative complexities attendant upon the redrawing of the apartheid political map within a new constitutional structure (which changed again, although less fundamentally, with the replacement of the interim constitution with a permanent constitution in 1997). The functions of the four old provinces, nine homeland governments and three ‘own affairs’ houses of parliament under the tricameral system have been redistributed to nine new provinces. This has necessitated the redeployment of the personnel concerned and their integration into new structures. The provincial administration for the Northern Transvaal, for instance, must bring together the former administrations of Venda, Lebowa and Gazankulu, part of the administration of the former Transvaal province, and elements of departments of the three former ‘own affairs’ administrations responsible for matters which are now provincial responsibilities. Changes in the structures and boundaries of the local state have been even more complex, with a three-stage model of transition from the racialized structures of apartheid to pre-interim, interim and, after the coming into force of the new
national constitution, final phases, all within less than five years (Cloete, 1995; Lemon, 1996a). Such administrative complexities at both provincial and local levels have inevitably hindered the implementation of redistributive and developmental policies, and in many cases even the administration of existing services has suffered.

The genuine sharing of space is hindered more fundamentally by the apartheid heritage. Whereas the passage of apartheid laws was followed, often swiftly, by forceful implementation, their repeal is essentially passive and permissive, occurring in the context of socio-economic structures moulded by over four decades of apartheid and a much longer period of segregative practice hitherto. The extent to which the state can or should intervene actively to accelerate the sharing of socio-economic space is a crucial question for the new government. The possibilities and the problems are explored here in relation to two key spatial issues: sharing the land and sharing the cities.

SHARING THE LAND: CONTEXT AND PROBLEMS

Nowhere is the apartheid heritage more starkly seen than on the land. The former political boundaries of the homelands continue to mark the division between commercial agriculture and farming which for most of its practitioners falls far below the needs of subsistence. The contrast in land use and population density is, in the words of Nattrass (1981:99), 'almost like stepping through a time warp'. The ten former homelands accounted for some 13 percent of South Africa's land, or 16 percent of its 106 million hectares of agricultural land, but in 1991 they were home to about 45 percent of South Africa's 38 million people. Some 7-8 million blacks in former homelands—a little less that half their total population—depend to some degree on the land (Hanekom, 1997a), though most have access to less than two hectares, compared with an average white landholding of 1,570 hectares. There are also an estimated 200,000 labor tenants and 1 million farm workers on white farms, with an estimated 4.5 million dependants. The number of white farmers declined from 119,000 in the early 1950s to 60,000 in the early 1980s, as market forces encouraging concentration received legislative reinforcement (Beinart, 1994). Numbers increased to 67,000 in the late 1980s, in part because of increasing numbers of part-time farms, especially close to towns. In 1997 there were an estimated 55,000 commercial farmers, 97 percent of whom were white (de Wet, 1997).

One quarter of these white farmers produce three-quarters of all marketable surpluses. The inefficiency of many white farmers has long been recognized: as long ago as 1970, the Du Plessis Commission found that the bottom third of white farmers produced only 3 percent of total output, and concluded that they should be encouraged to leave the land (South Africa, 1970). It was only in the 1980s, however, that the government began to reduce levels of support for white farmers; they still received over R4 billion in subsidies between 1980 and 1991 (Williams, 1996), but found their political influence diminishing as the government sought resources...
to fund the ‘reform’ of apartheid. Farmers were simultaneously confronted with rising input costs, higher interest rates, mounting debts, worsening terms of trade in domestic markets, intense competition in export markets, and severe and extended drought (Francis and Williams, 1993). The resultant crisis has encouraged a process of agricultural restructuring which is long overdue; insolvency has forced many farmers out of business, especially in the summer grain areas of the southern Transvaal, northern Free State and parts of Natal, and the wool-producing Karoo (de Klerk, 1993). Accompanying shifts in land use (Table 1) generally represent a more efficient use of economic resources, although the shift to stock farming has reduced employment. Many farmers have stabilized their incomes by taking part-time, non-farm employment, often devolving day-to-day management to black employees and renting out some of their land. This creates the potential for the phased emergence of black farmers into independent production, probably through share tenancy, which could contribute in a small way to the wider restructuring which is needed (de Klerk, 1993). Beinart (1994) notes that the relatively high turnover of white land—some 4 percent p.a., much of it outside family transactions—is also conducive to market-led reforms.

Table 1: Changes in agricultural land use since 1980 (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Field crops</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Horticulture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>nearly 50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: de Klerk, 1993:375.

With the passing in 1991 of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act the National Party government repealed the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, but in terms which left property rights and social relations intact, and which continued to regulate the use and division of land in the name of conservation and commercial development. The 1992 White Paper on land reform claimed that the Act ensured equal access to land, but this meant little for the vast majority of blacks who lacked resources to purchase land on the open market. The ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) aims to transfer 30 percent of land in historically white farming areas to black smallholders within five years. This is clearly not possible: in the first three years, only 900,000 hectares of private and state land has been identified for eventual transfer (Hanekom, 1997a). The RDP figure originated in a report of the World Bank (1993), where it appeared in an indicative model which was not intended to be used as a target (Williams, 1996). The Bank estimated the public costs of settling over 600,000 smallholdings on 30 percent of the land (24 million hectares) in four selected zones—periurban areas, summer grain regions, the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape wine farms—would be R3.5 billion p.a. over five years. Such a costing inevitably depends on assumptions about land prices, yields, crop
prices and target incomes; it also underestimates administrative costs and fails to realize the higher costs of research, extension and technical assistance to small farms (Williams, 1996).

Such World Bank approaches are also open to the objection that they constitute, without saying so, a vast resettlement project (Murray and Williams, 1994). Such a project would be open (for participants or those displaced, such as farm workers and their dependents) to all the risks identified by Cernea (1996) in his ethnography of resettlement and displacement worldwide, namely landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, economic marginalization, food insecurity, morbidity, and social disarticulation. De Wet (1994) considers seven different resettlement scenarios and concludes that all too often disruption of people’s socio-economic relationships and changes in their access to resources have left many people vulnerable and at risk of impoverishment; their coping strategies are restricted in the early years while they are finding their feet, and their problems may be accentuated by an inflexible settlement regime. Even return to lands originally occupied (see below) has its problems: ‘We should have no illusion that this is a second move—albeit a return home—and that in a sense a previously broken leg is being broken a second time in order to set it properly for recovery’ (de Wet, 1994).

In the extensive academic literature on the land question in South Africa, two themes recur again and again: local complexity and community participation. Both argue against the imposition of inflexible policies from above, whether or not they constitute resettlement schemes. The importance of local variations cannot be over-emphasized:

Matters of land and agricultural production are always particular and never general. (Williams, 1996:166)

Restructuring needs to be informed by a sense of the complex, ambiguous and antagonistic nature of the discourses that shape rural struggles on the ground. (du Toit, 1994:378)

Analysis of the potential for land reform should remain sensitive to local ecological and economic conditions and to the current strategies of both [white] farmers and the dispossessed. (Beinart 1994:389)

The debate on land and agrarian policy is being concluded in an environment of great ignorance regarding what is really happening on the ground. (Levin and Weiner, 1993:36)

Reforms which concentrate on national divisions between black and white while ignoring local divisions between black and black will ultimately fail. (Buckle, 1995:83)

National agendas of reconstruction that are not rooted in the complexities of local geographies and histories, will be roundly rejected by
millions of rural poor in the bantustans and on white-owned farms. 
(Crush and Jeeves, 1993, 354)

Questions about land are also questions about gender relations, generational differences, labor and employment, access to markets, and rural-urban interaction (Murray and Williams, 1994). People want land in South Africa, in both urban and rural areas, not only to graze livestock or to grow crops, but as a place to return to in old age or unemployment, and as a security which they can rent, sell or bequeath to their children. Land is much more than a means of production: it is variously a source of security, status and power. Buckle (1995), investigating the communities of Mgwali and Lesseyton in the eastern Cape, found that differential patterns of land tenure remained critical to societal differentiation in the absence of production, as there had been little agriculture in either community in the 1980s. Demands for land ownership were prompted by considerations often far removed from production, and the attitudes of the most needy in some respects contributed to their own marginalization.

Such studies underline the need for negotiation with those on the land to avoid irreversible mistakes, and for education concerning the options and problems of entering new tenurial and social relationships. Research agendas themselves need to be truly participatory (Levin and Weiner, 1993), and policy implementation is unlikely to succeed without such involvement. This is, however, far from simple. National and provincial governments are rightly keen to respond as speedily as possible to widespread demands for land, but participatory research and policy implementation require time, resources and infinite patience and sensitivity. Both local government structures and the institutions of civil society—trade unions, women’s organizations, farmers’ associations, church bodies, and other local associations—are weakly developed in rural South Africa, especially in the former homelands, where local government and civil society are complicated by the continuing importance of traditional authorities (Christiansen, 1995; Nthai, 1995). In their study of commercial smallholder development in the former KaNgwane homeland, McIntosh and Vaughan conclude that

Where a wealthy class of independent farmers with similar interest to, and partly intersecting, the local and regional government authorities co-exists with a large impoverished and landless population without the resources around which to mobilize effectively, the formal trappings of democracy might not be sufficient to ensure meaningful participation in the body politic. (McIntosh and Vaughan, 1995:123–4)

Such conclusions could equally apply to those who work on white-owned farms. With their families, they constitute just under one-third of South Africa’s rural population, yet they have so far been ‘oddly peripheral to the current land debate’ (du Toit 1994:375). These people too have their local practices and institutions, their localized struggles with distinctively detailed textures.
South Africa's ANC-dominated government has adopted a land reform policy which is intended to redress the injustices of apartheid, foster national reconciliation and stability, underpin economic growth, and alleviate poverty (Hanekom, 1997b). It has three main components: restitution, land tenure reform and redistribution, each of which will now be briefly reviewed, together with measures affecting the welfare of farm workers.

The de Klerk government made a very tentative start on restitution in 1991 by establishing an Advisory Committee on Land Allocation whose job was to identify state land for restoration to victims of forced removals. In 1993 it proposed to give the committee powers rather than simply to advise the government. The new government has gone much further by passing the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 1994 and appointing both a Land Commission and a Land Claims Court in 1995. Claims are restricted to compensation (in land or money) for acts of dispossession since the passing of the Native Land Act in 1913, and all claims have to be submitted by the 30 April 1998.4 The inability of the majority of the population to furnish written evidence makes this option feasible for only a small part of the population in practice (Hanekom, 1997b), but some 17,000 claims had been registered by August 1997. Claims go first to the Commission and then to the Court for approval of agreements or, if necessary, adjudication. Progress is painfully slow, and by August 1997 only one claim had been fully processed, and fifteen placed before the Court (Business Day, 1997a). To speed up this cumbersome procedure the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Bill (1997) provides a means of circumventing the Court where agreement is reached, or, in certain cases, for claimants to bypass the Commission and take claims directly to the Court.

Both restitution and redistribution are expensive for the state, because compensation must be paid either to claimants or to whites whose land is expropriated. The constitution allows expropriation only for public purposes or in the public interest, provided that legally approved compensation is paid. The ANC argues that this need not equal the full market value if the land was acquired very cheaply from the state, whilst the Pan Africanist Congress argues that compensation should only be payable for improvements made (Kotze and Basson, 1994). White farmers not surprisingly demand the full market value of their land. Levin and Weiner (1994) regard the constitutional position as unduly favorable to white property rights rather than the rights of those who have suffered under colonialism and apartheid. The government has, however, made it clear that it does not intend to follow the current example of President Mugabe in Zimbabwe. To do so would undermine both the spirit of national reconciliation which President Mandela has tried so hard to forge, and the foreign investment which his government is working so hard to attract.

As mentioned earlier, the ANC's initial approach to redistribution was directly influenced by the World Bank proposals. Accordingly, the Department of Land Affairs began by setting up pilot land reform projects and planning a land reform
strategy. However, administrative and fiscal realities forced the Department to scale down the World Bank proposals dramatically. It has also been motivated by a concern to maintain public confidence in the land market, which could be undermined by policies involving large-scale expropriation of white-owned land. Instead of what amounted to an extensive resettlement program, the government's main instrument of land redistribution is the offer of individual Land Settlement/Acquisition Grants of R15,000 (equivalent to the National Housing Subsidy available in urban areas to eligible beneficiaries). This grant was subsequently increased to R17,500. The program targets labor tenants, farmworkers, women and emergent farmers. The green paper promises that by 2006, rights in land will be secured for a large proportion of those eligible (South Africa, 1996).

The South African Agricultural Union, representing white farmers, has criticized the grant as inadequate to establish black farmers, arguing that the policy will lead to mass dumping grounds for rural people and expressing its concern about the loss of agricultural land (Business Day, 1996a, 1997b). The government naturally wishes to help as many people as possible, and envisages people coming together in small-scale settlement schemes which depend on the pooling of the grant to obtain land. This is indeed happening, but the hope that the grants would leverage funds from private and other sources has not materialized, which is restricting the scope of the program; the Land Bank is likely to play a critical role in achieving such leverage as it expands to serve black as well as white farmers (Duncan, 1997). There is clearly a danger that the viability of projects will be undermined if collective purchase leads to overcrowding. Restricted access to loan financing has reportedly forced people to sell livestock, an important source of income, to raise the finance for land acquisition in projects in the Natal Midlands (Business Day, 1996b).

The pattern of Land Reform Projects so far approved is summarized in Table 2. The slow start in 1994 and 1995 is apparent, but what is more disturbing is the decrease in the number of approvals between 1996 and 1997, which is equally reflected in data for households affected and the area of land involved; in terms of eventual transferal, this seems likely to impact on performance in 1998 and possibly 1999 (Land Update, 1997). The 1997 figures may, however, be incomplete, as the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs claimed at the end of November 1997 that 380 projects had been approved to date—133 more than the overall figure in Table 2 (Hanekom, 1997b). Some 50,000 households will benefit from projects so far approved, sharing just under 500,000 hectares.

Three provinces—KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape—account for two-thirds of all the households affected, which means that the impact of land reform is so far minimal in other provinces, with the exception of the sparsely populated Northern Cape.

If problems can be surmounted and progress accelerated, the redistribution policy does have considerable merits. It avoids the pitfalls of resettlement and the inflexibility of imposed top-down policies, allowing local initiatives to succeed. It opens space for gradual acquisition, under secure forms of tenure. It targets disadvantaged
Table 2: Number of land reform projects approved, designated and transferred, 1994–97.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZ/Natal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Cape</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCape</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Terminology

Approved (A) refers to the stage in the Redistribution Project Cycle when a project has been approved by the Provincial Project Approval Committee. This implies commitment of the Settlement Planning Grant (9% of the R15,000 Settlement Land Acquisition Grant).

Designation (D) means that identified land has been designated for settlement by the Minister of Land Affairs.

Transfer (T) means that land rights have been registered in the name of the beneficiaries of a land Reform Project.

Grand total: Approved—247, Designated—110, Transferred—63.


groups, although not, at the moment, those in the former homelands owing to confusion over land rights (Cross, 1997; see below). It goes some way to meeting a very widespread demand for small amounts of land: in a recent survey two-thirds of those wanting land (or more land) for farming said they wanted only 1.2 hectares or less.6

The Department of Land Affairs has adopted a ‘rights-based’ approach to land tenure reform which parallels, in its emphasis on flexibility, the redistribution policy. Its policy makes no fundamental distinction between tribal authority areas (in the former homelands) and the rest of the country, but allows for the retention of communal tenure where this is the wish of those involved.7 The new policy seeks to confirm in law whatever rights and interest in respect of land tenure people already had on the ground, including farm workers, labor tenants and women (for all of whom recognition of interest is potentially crucial). It therefore involves finding ways of transforming de facto relationships to land into formal rights. It also seeks to address the relationship between group rights and individual rights and to ensure that each is legally protected. The policy is intended to give people the right to make decisions about their own tenure system. The problem, once again, is the time
taken to implement such policies community by community—twenty years has been suggested. Cross (1997) argues in relation to tribal authority areas (former homelands) that legislation has to stay minimal and flexible, meeting the needs of those near towns who tend to want more individualization as well as those in more remote areas who prefer to retain communal tenure. Informal land transactions, already widespread in tribal authority areas, need to become legal, with written security. The role of the government would essentially be one of providing the rules for economic transactions, and doing so in a way which allows intensive community participation.

It is encouraging that the government is trying to improve the lot of farm workers and labor tenants. The former did not even receive the limited protection of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act or the Unemployment Insurance Act until 1992, with the former’s provisions subsequently incorporated into a new Agricultural Labor Relations Act in 1994, conferring basic rights and provision for collective bargaining. In practice extreme dependence on employers and the impracticability of collective action frequently mean that labor relations remained little changed in many areas. The new government has attempted to improve security of tenure for both farm workers and labor tenants. Correctly anticipating that the imminence of new measures could lead to evictions, the government passed the Informal Protection of Land Rights Act in 1996; in practice, however, evictions did increase substantially in the months before more permanent legislation came on to the statute book and were often carried out very harshly. Large informal settlements of sacked and evicted farm workers who are living in extreme poverty are growing around the towns in rural areas (Greenberg, 1997). Informal land rights were legally recognized in the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Amendment Act of 1996, as a precursor to granting formal rights. The Land Reform (Labor Tenants) Act of 1996 provided for labor tenants and their families to acquire land and security of tenure in their places of residence. Most importantly, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of November 1997 (and in theory retrospective to February) attempts to improve tenure security for 6 million rural people. The National Land Committee, an NGO fighting for black land rights, has welcomed the Act but pointed to its conservatism in key respects (Business Day, 1997c). Overall, the government has shown both energy and resolution in relation to land tenure issues, and it may well be, when the record of these early years is examined by historians, that tenure reforms will be seen to have brought tangible benefits to more people than either the restitution or redistribution programs.

SHARING THE CITIES

South African cities have reflected white dominance in the social formation since colonial times. Until at least the 1950s, they shared many characteristics of other African and colonial cities (Simon, 1984). In the absence of significant indigenous
urbanism, whites came to regard the cities as their cultural domain, treating blacks only as temporary sojourners whose role in the city was to provide ‘labor power without laborers’ (Maylam, 1990). Such attitudes led in the present century to controls on black migration to the cities and to segregation. Segregationist policies, embodied in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, were in turn succeeded by the more rigid and far-reaching policy of urban apartheid, symbolized above all by the Group Areas Acts of 1950 and 1966. No other country has embarked on so thorough a reorganization of its urban space for the purposes of segregation (Lemon, 1991). The architects of apartheid did so in the realization that social relations are ‘both space forming and space contingent’ (Western, 1981), seeking through the regulation of urban space to minimize social contact and maximize white minority control of the social formation.

Despite such fundamental urban restructuring, the apartheid city cannot be cut off from its roots. If many elements of earlier phases have survived the ruthless restructuring of apartheid (Christopher, 1983), who can doubt Wills’ (1991) contention that ‘the shadow of apartheid planning will be evident in the geography of the city for years to come’? The repeal of the Group Areas Act in 1991 may be compared with the repeal of the Land Acts: both are essentially passive and permissive, occurring in the context of socio-economic structures moulded over four decades of apartheid and a much longer period of segregative practice hitherto. The processes and patterns of change in post-apartheid cities offer a rich research field for urban, social and political geographers. They present the opportunity to monitor and measure the process of residential desegregation and its consequences; to assess planning policy changes including land zoning and acquisition which affect urbanization, informal settlement and the spatial form of the post-apartheid city; and to assess the degree to which changes in the provision of housing, transport and services are improving conditions for those who were formerly living under apartheid (Lemon, 1996b). This paper seeks no more than to raise some of the major questions and make brief reference to the government’s Urban Development Strategy (South Africa, 1995).

Smith (1994) is almost alone in raising the issue of restitution in relation to urban land confiscation under Group Areas legislation. Such confiscation should be thoroughly recorded, making restitution considerably easier than in rural areas, but it does not appear to be on the agenda of South Africa’s first post-apartheid government. Such restitution has taken place in post-socialist Eastern Europe, but it would appear that the complexity and the cost, in view of the numbers involved, have deterred the ANC from tackling such a potentially sensitive and explosive issue.

Geographers made an important and distinctive contribution to the measurement of both segregation and the beginnings of desegregation in the apartheid years (Christopher, 1989, 1990, 1991; Rule, 1988, 1989; Simon, 1989; Bernstein and McCarthy, 1990; Saff, 1990, 1991; Elder, 1990; Lemon, 1991). Perhaps surprisingly, there has been far less concern to monitor change since the removal of legislative controls. This may reflect recognition that, in the foreseeable future, residential desegregation will affect only a small minority of the population, but the signifi-
cance of desegregation goes beyond numbers. Not only does it offer the chance to compare South African experience with that of other societies, but in South Africa itself desegregation is a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite of improved mutual tolerance, understanding and (more distantly) a degree of social integration. This is particularly important in relation to whites, who, given the demographic arithmetic and the desirability of their suburbs, will be much the most affected by desegregation.

Hart (1989) argues that segregation in South African cities, freed from legal enforcement, will not disappear but will rather follow the American experience of tipping points, blockbusting and ghettoization. Experience in Harare, Windhoek and many areas in South Africa suggest otherwise, pointing to a model of (largely) peaceful co-existence. Hart’s model appears to be based very much on areas such as Hillbrow in inner-city Johannesburg, and may prove applicable to some inner areas of other South African cities.

For most blacks, and many Indians and colored people, if sharing the city is to mean anything it will be the sharing of urban resources and the services they provide under the nonracial local authorities elected in 1995 and 1996. The apartheid heritage is again a constraint, given the grossly skewed distribution of resources in favor of former white areas. White fears of the consequences of sharing resources and the potential burdens of large townships and informal settlements were clearly shown in arguments over the boundaries of the new authorities, for example in Johannesburg and Cape Town (Lemon, 1996a). The whole problem of urban service provision is made more difficult by the continuing culture of non-payment which stems from the years of anti-apartheid resistance, but has now become a habit and even spread to the white population to some degree. The state’s Masakhane campaign to persuade people to pay rents and service charges has largely failed.

Urbanization levels in South Africa are characterized by marked racial disparities. Indians are the most urbanized, with 88 percent living in the greater metropolitan areas, compared with 66 percent of whites, 56 percent of colored people, and 37 percent of Africans (Calitz, 1996). A further 16 percent of Africans live in other towns, though half of these are in smaller towns which might reasonably be considered part of ‘rural’ South Africa. Only 800,000 whites and coloreds, and virtually no Indians, live in truly rural areas, compared with some 16 million Africans. There is thus scope for massive further African urbanization. During the apartheid period African urbanization was not so much prevented as displaced across the borders of nearby homelands—Bophuthatswana for Pretoria, KwaZulu for Durban and Pietermaritzburg, Ciskei for East London, for example. If these homeland townships and informal settlements are included in figures for ‘functional urbanization’, the levels were increasing steadily even before the formal ending of racially discriminatory influx control in 1986. Thereafter there was some acceleration in black urbanization, and also a degree of spatial shift, with some opportunities to settle informally within black townships or on white-owned land; however many of those taking these opportunities were moving out of overcrowded township living conditions rather than migrating from rural areas (Crankshaw, 1993). The alternatives
were in any case still limited, as group areas legislation still applied and the amounts of land in or close to the cities released for informal settlement were small. People were freer to move to the cities, but where were they to live?

This problem has by no means disappeared in practice with the ending of apartheid, and there has been no sudden explosion of black urbanization since the political transition in 1994. However continued increase is certain, as well as continued spatial re-sorting of the black urban population now that more alternatives are open to them. Just what alternatives depends on provincial and local planning approaches. For many authorities the temptation must be to build on land already bought contiguous to former group areas and townships, and to service it inexpensively by expanding existing reticulation networks, rather than to ‘crack the racial mould’ (Pirie, 1991). The government has inherited 92,000 serviced sites based on apartheid planning, which it feels constrained to use (Business Day, 1997d). What is needed ideally is large supplies of well located, affordable land to house poor people closer to workplaces and services than in apartheid cities which relegated the poor to the periphery. This raises many questions: should planners seek to increase densities in the more affluent suburban areas, in the interest of a more compact city? Should a graduated land tax encourage such a process? Should the ‘buffer strips’ between former group areas be used for residential development? How far is it politically feasible to locate the poor adjacent to middle-class suburbs? How and where can the recreational needs of township populations be better served by the provision of parks and sports facilities? And, given that the land market is clearly going to remain essentially capitalist, what manner and degree of intervention to bring land on the market is appropriate?

The Development Facilitation Act of 1995 aims to create a ‘fast track’ option for land development as an alternative to existing legislation. By reducing developers’ land holding costs the Act may also reduce land prices. In addition, by relaxing zoning regulations and allowing some mixed zoning of residential and non-residential uses, the Act aims to encourage a more compact city with higher-density suburbs. Progress towards these aims is bound to be slow, however. Distant settlements across former homeland boundaries will remain home to large numbers of people; as some manage to move closer to the city and perhaps obtain formal housing, other households are likely to take their place. The persistence of these vast settlements raises major questions about allocation of resources: how far should money be spent improving conditions for ‘South Africa’s hidden urbanites’ in sub-optimal locations such as the Winterveld, former KwaNdebele and Ciskei, and the more remote industrial growth points created by apartheid? (CDE, 1996). Similarly, the high levels of bus and rail commuter subsidy made necessary by this apartheid planning are a problem: bus subsidies amounted to R693m. in 1995–6, while the total subsidy allocated to rail commuter services in 1996–7 was R1.4 billion (SAIRR, 1997a). This is an unproductive use of resources, but the withdrawal of subsidies would be disastrous for many commuters whose long journey to work is a consequence of inherited apartheid settlement geography.
The government is seeking to address inherited inequalities through subsidizing housing and service provision for the poor. Housebuilding got off to a very slow start, and by September 1997, after three and a half years, only 36.2 percent of the government’s promised million houses in five years had been built, but 673,188 household housing subsidies had been approved (SAIRR, 1997b). More than two-thirds of the state housing subsidy goes to households earning less than R1,500 per month. The provincial funding formula is also weighted in favor of rural populations by a factor of 1.25, and provisions concerning the housing subsidy of R15,000 are particularly generous for migrant laborers, allowing a choice between work location and permanent home, and, if the latter, additional subsidy for improving single quarters. Whilst the focus on those most discriminated against in the past is laudable, this effectively endorses the urbanization policies of apartheid, and may ultimately prejudice rural Africans who later wish to move permanently to the cities (Crankshaw and Parnell, 1996).

South Africa currently lacks a real urbanization strategy. Its draft Urban Development Strategy (South Africa, 1996) shows a metropolitan bias, failing to realize the need to focus on the entire urban hierarchy, including secondary cities and smaller towns, using the investment made in the their schools, facilities and infrastructure; it also pays too little attention to rural-urban linkages (Lemon, 1999; CDE, 1996). It lacks investment criteria relating to resettled and displaced people, and has no clear prioritization apart from an emphasis on rebuilding the townships which receives no detailed justification. It is silent on such vital issues as urban employment creation, crime prevention, and continued non-payment of rents and service charges. It has also been strongly criticized for its marked departures from the Reconstruction and Development Programme—the omission of community organizations, women’s and other groups, lower service standards, an emphasis on cost-recovery instead of subsidization, and an excessively pro-business orientation (Bond et al., 1996). It is symptomatic of the present inadequacies of urban strategic planning that the Ministry of Housing has been entrusted with managing the Urban Development Task Team (CDE, 1996); this is likely to continue present preoccupation with such issues as housing delivery and the roles of the state and private sector in low-cost housing provision rather than the development of a true urbanization strategy (Crankshaw and Parnell, 1996).

CONCLUSION

If we look back to the late 1980s, before transition in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, change in South Africa seemed inevitable but by no means round the corner. After the disaster of President P. W. Botha’s ‘Rubicon’ speech in November 1985, some white business leaders took the then remarkable step of meeting ANC leaders. They emerged with some optimism about ANC ‘moderation’ in government, but we may presume that no detailed discussions of policy took place. Let us
imagine, however, that the white side had put to the ANC a program for sharing the land and sharing the cities along similar lines to those actually being pursued in 1998. There is little doubt that the ANC, even at its most diplomatic, would have rejected much of the program as too supportive of white interests, insufficiently redistributive, insufficiently interventionist and allowing too great a role for private capital. Such policies would have been condemned as falling far short of the radical restructuring and revolutionary transformation which the organization demanded.

To say this is in no way to suggest that the ANC has betrayed its ideals. There is always an inevitable gap between rhetoric and reality, as the experience of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia shows only too clearly, but in the South African case the reality was changing too: the global environment, in a post-Communist era, was utterly different from that in which the ANC had conducted the liberation struggle. Its policies since coming into power clearly reflect appreciation of new global realities and their implications for aid, investment, and also for domestic relations between state and capital. Inevitably this has led to fierce criticism from radicals, though perhaps more from academics than politicians. More importantly, the limited degree to which the government has so far delivered on its promises of redistribution has inevitably caused widespread disappointment. The publication by the Department of Finance in June 1996 of its strategy for Growth, Employment and Redistribution clearly signaled a shift in emphasis from redistribution to growth.

Formerly white political parties and their supporters must be relieved that their fears have not been realized, but they naturally find plenty to criticize in the policies being pursued: if they did not, there would be real cause to worry. The richness of debate is itself encouraging evidence of the strength of civil society in South Africa, and in a situation of one-party dominant democracy (Southall 1994) it is vitally important that the state shows itself responsive to the organs of civil society, sufficiently secure to recognize its errors, and prepared to modify policies in the light of experience. No one doubts the complexity and scale of South Africa’s reconstructive task. There are no easy or ideal solutions to its problems, many of which arise from the tensions implicit in trying to achieve non-material goals, such as justice and reconciliation, with limited material resources (de Wet, 1997). Current policies which seek to deal with the sharing of the land and the sharing of the cities are certainly and inevitably flawed, but they do represent a serious start to the task of improving the conditions of life for millions of people.

NOTES

1. These terms, denoting officially classified ‘racial’ groups in the apartheid era, are still in widespread use in South Africa, although since the repeal of the Population Registration Act in 1991 they have no longer been used for official data collection purposes.
2. Labor tenants work part-time on white farms in return for the use of a plot of land.

3. Approximately £0.75 million in terms of the fluctuating exchange rates of the 1980s; the current rate is £1=R8.

4. It is likely that this date will be extended. Cases of unfair dispossession not addressed by the Act, including those dispossessed before 1913, are to be prioritized by the land reform program.

5. US$1=R5 approximately.

6. The survey was carried out by the Land and Agricultural Policy Center among people in tribal authority areas, townships and informal settlements and on farms. It is reported in Land Update, 44, Jan/Feb 1996, p.8.

7. Cross (1992) argues that communal tenure is a misnomer. Not only is the use of arable land individual, but in many areas this is increasingly true of ownership. The community retains a right of oversight rather than shared ownership. This effectively counters the often-used argument that communal tenure lowers productivity because it hinders individual initiative and enterprise. In his study of four Eastern Cape villages with different tenure systems, Mini (1995) actually found that far more people in Mbongweni, the village with communal tenure, were cultivating their land than in the other areas.

8. The ‘Rubicon’ speech was widely expected to announce fundamental change—the crossing of the Rubicon—but failed to do so. This led Chase Manhattan and other banks to refuse to roll over short-term loans to South Africa, and resulted in a net outflow of capital from the country in the late 1980s.

REFERENCES


—. (1996b) Land reform stocktaking. 27 November.
—. (1997b) Settlement act creates poverty traps, says SAAU. 30 October.
—. (1997c) Fears of white farmers ‘nursed for too long by ANC govt’. 26 February.
—. (1997d) Urban framework to promote vision of sustainable cities. 14 November.


Anthony Lemon


