Nationalizing Everyday Life: Individual and Collective Identities as Practice and Discourse

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Much of the literature on nationalism and national identity aims at outlining these phenomena in very generalized terms and therefore often remains abstract as far as concrete, localized forms of nationalism and national identities are concerned. This paper begins from the idea that both nationalism and national identity are contested and contextual categories which always emerge, are reproduced and modified in certain territorial contexts. Both of these categories are structured in specific social practices and discourses, in which individual and collective forms of identity become fused. National discourses mostly enter the everyday lives of ordinary people through the media, national education and national practices such as various spectacles. All these phenomena are constituents of spatial socialization, which typically mediates images of the homogeneous nature of a national culture and identity. Particular emphasis will therefore be put on practices and discourses through which generalized narratives, symbols and institutions of national identity are created and on how they are reproduced in everyday life. As a concrete illustration of spatial socialization processes, the paper discusses the roles of education and military service in the case of Finland.

Keywords: Nationalism, territoriality, identity, national socialization, ideology, everyday life.

This article aims at scrutinizing social practices in which local, personal experience becomes fused with the national, that is how nationalism and discourses of national identity become part of everyday life. National discourses mostly enter the daily lives of ordinary people through the media, national education and national practices such as various spectacles (Billig, 1995). The aim here is to evaluate how territory and territoriality are transformed into national practices and meanings and how spatial socialization occurs. Spatial socialization may be defined as the process through which individual actors and collectivities are socialized as members of specific, territorially bounded spatial entities, and through which they more or less actively internalize territorial identities and shared traditions (Paasi, 1996). Particular emphasis will therefore be put on practices and discourses through which generalized narratives, symbols and institutions of national identity—with Finnishness as the specific example—are created and how they become sedimented in everyday life. The latter is the ultimate basis upon which collective forms of identity and territo-

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ritality become reproduced (cf. Cohen, 1982). Concrete examples will be taken from two particular fields of social practices—education and military service.

**TERRITORY, NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY**

Nationalism and national identity are typical forms of social practice and discourse, in which individual and collective forms of identity become fused. According to the famous—but narrow—definition put forward by Gellner (1983), nationalism is a political principle which holds that the political unit and the national unit should be congruent. While both the national and political territories may be deeply contested categories and nationalism, as well as national identity, inevitably modifies peoples daily lives outside explicit political concerns as well (Calhoun, 1997), nationalism is nevertheless a specific, strategic form of territoriality and an expression of the struggle for control over land and socio-spatial consciousness. National identity, for its part, refers to a number of elements which link the idea of a territory with culture, language, history and memory. Nationalism legitimates national identity by tracing it back to a real or fictional common past and territory. ‘Nationalism’ itself is also a disputed category for academic scholars, who have constructed their theories on different grounds (Smith, 1998).

Nationalism is nowadays typically associated both in academic and popular writing with groups of people who struggle to create new states or with extreme right-wing politics (Billig, 1995). This means that it is in a way peripheralized—it is understood as being a phenomenon that is mainly practiced by emerging nations or states. In this view it is often understood as going hand in hand with the emancipation and self-determination of the people as sovereign within the state. In this logic it is understood as being something not existing in the old, established states, or perhaps a rather marginal phenomenon that is practiced only by some young extremists. The definitions given to the idea of nationalism generally support this view, since they often refer to the historical processes in which specific socio-cultural and political entities labeled as nations, states or nation-states emerge. Smith (1998) shows that the idea of nationalism has been used in three main ways. First it points to the entire process by which nations and nation-states have come into existence. The nation-building (and/or state-building) process is an abstraction that is commonly used in the literature to depict this process. On the other hand, nationalism may concern particularly one of this broad set of processes, that is the formation of national consciousness, solidarity and sentiments. Third, nationalism is regarded as an ideological movement.

The state plays a fundamental role in the process of nation-state formation. Enormous expansions of the activities of the modern state—both internally and externally—have led to an increasing presence of the state in daily life (Smith, 1992). It is thus almost taken for granted as a part of daily experience in the current world, understood as a grid of bounded territorial units (Mach, 1993; Paasi, 1999). This
also holds good in the case of two key processes of nation-building: nationalism and national integration. Both of these are typically so naturalized that they are rarely questioned today, but it is through them that the physical and social space of a nation is transformed into cultural spaces, which are then typically represented as being internally homogeneous homes of ‘us’. This homogenization process typically takes place in relation to the Other—which may be located both outside and inside the territory. Nationalism has therefore become a major constituent of our sense of identity, the latter being understood as a system of absolute values. This is, of course, partly an illusion: whereas nationalism on the one hand appears to be an integrative force unifying separate territorial units into a nation-state, in many states it may also be a disintegrative power which aims to emancipate and separate some territorially based groups from the larger territory of the existing state. This simply goes back to the fact that currently exist less than 200 states in the world, whereas the number of nations is perhaps some 400–600. This means that nationalism and the physical and symbolic violence used both by the existing states and by the groups that struggle to establish their own state will continue to be with us in the foreseeable future. The existing states are naturally very powerful in the control that they exercise over social consciousness. As the statistics of Amnesty International or the International Pen Club reveal, this control, in the form of sanctions and even murders, is typically directed against intellectuals that wield some power in the production of this consciousness: novelists, poets, editors, journalists, or students.

Many studies of nationalism and national identity outline these phenomena in generalized terms and often remain abstract as far as concrete, localized forms of nationalism and national identities are concerned. Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) argue that the specificity of nationalism, what distinguishes national identity from other forms of identity, is based on the fact that the source of identity is located within a ‘people’, understood as the bearer of sovereignty and the basis of collective solidarity. National identity has hence become a keyword in the definition of the ‘essence’ of the individual, and is only slightly modified by other identities. They also point out that national identities are based on another fundamentalism, the idea of the world as consisting of nations.

DECONSTRUCTING ‘NATIONAL IDENTITY’

Nationalism is very much a hidden element in our contemporary life and a much more typically used expression is national identity. This is a curious linguistic transformation, since while being two sides of the same coin, nationalism—while it may be an emancipatory force—often bears negative connotations, whereas identity is typically a very positively laden word.

The aim of this paper is to map the various dimensions of national identity. I will first evaluate the meanings of the concept of identity and the links between identity and ideology. This will be followed by an evaluation of the dimensions of national identity, the roles of spatial scales and narratives in the construction of identities.
Several commentators have argued that identity is one of the keywords of current times (Schlesinger, 1991). They have emphasized that identities are not fixed and permanent—if they have ever been—and that human beings, particularly in the western capitalist states, increasingly construct their identities in personal, unique ways, using alternative ‘materials’ and experiences. This discussion puts emphasis on the dynamics and change that characterize the ideas of individual or personal identity, typically discussed under the label ‘self’. One illustration of the curious rise of identity topics in the social sciences is the fact that in ‘Keywords’, his influential book evaluating the crucial categories in social science in the mid-1970s, Williams (1976) did not pay any attention to identity. The logical place of this word between ‘idealism’ and ‘ideology’ is empty!

While remaining an extremely complicated category, national identity has become a major catchword in social and cultural studies (Lash & Friedman, 1992; Friedman, 1994; Cohen, 1994; Michael, 1996; Hall and Du Guy, 1996), and geographers have also paid increasing attention to this idea (Hooson, 1994; Dijkink, 1996). Hall (1996:1) points out, that “there has been a veritable discursive explosion in recent years around the concept of ‘identity’, at the same time as it has been subjected to a searching critique”. This critique has been increasingly directed at any essentialist notions of integral, original or unified identity. A simple survey using one www-search engine gives more than 20,000 web pages for the phrase ‘national identity’, many of them announcements of conferences that aim at mapping this soap-like phenomenon.

What, then, is ‘identity’? Some authors argue that the category is applicable to individuals rather than collectives (Schlesinger, 1991). A psychological approach normally comprehends identity as a view of the self, that people develop as acting agents, while being objects of their own and others’ observations and interpretations. The key question in this view is ‘who am I?’ (Guibernau, 1996:72). In the Middle Ages the word ‘identicus’ referred to similarity. Whereas the individual image of the self emerges, in a sense, as if a person were a purely independent actor (which in practice is not the case), similarity points to collective, or shared elements. Locality, region, class, gender, or generation, for instance, may provide frameworks for the rise of collective identities and the existence of such identities usually requires both a set of social practices and discourses/narratives that join people together. Others want to avoid essentialism in understanding identities and argue that they are never unified but rather increasingly fragmented and fractured, never singular but rather multiple constructed across diverging intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions (Hall, 1996).

There is a tendency to comprehend national identity as a collection of historically accumulated institutional practices, systems of signs and meanings, a collection which is more permanent than individual identities. The idea of the historical ‘sedimentation’ of signs and rituals in discourses and practices therefore always brings a specific rigidity into collective identities. This is, of course, one part of the possibility for the continuity of social existence. As Douglas (1986, 55) points out,
"for discourse to be possible at all, the basic categories have to be agreed on. Nothing else but institutions can define sameness. Similarity is an institution". This is doubtless true, but sameness and similarity, while being institutions, must be based on other practices and discourses which are linked with the power relations in society which occur on all spatial scales.

The idea of nationalism and national identity proposed in this article resembles the arguments of Billig (1995), who discusses banal nationalism. By this he means the ideological habits which enable the established nations (of the West) to be reproduced. In its banal forms, nationalism is constantly flagged in the media through routine symbols and habits of language, the political rhetoric of governments, the sport pages of newspapers, etc. (Billig, 1995). Even though political leaders and others are not labeled as activists, much of their discourse is based on national and even territorial frameworks. Billig's approach strongly emphasizes the meanings of discourse, and he reminds us that to have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood.

National flagging may also occur in more materialized ways. Palmer (1998) looks in detail at three areas of the material world in which mundane flags are waved: the body, food, and the landscape. By tradition, both the body and landscape have been used in allegoric and metaphoric ways in national discourses ('the Maid of Finland', 'Mother Russia') but they have also material dimensions (Paasi, 1996). As Palmer points out, "how we use our bodies, in the foods we consume and in our relationships with the landscape there is a continual reminder of who we are and what we believe in. This is why individuals do not forget their identity". Palmer writes, "they are continually aware of it in the habits and social processes that organize and maintain their lives. It is at this level that theoretical concepts of nation, nationalism, and identity are translated into a language that people can understand and experience, even if unconsciously" (Palmer, 1998: 195).

What keeps the national imagination going is daily habits and routines. National identity is thus often hidden in trivial forms of daily routines which are taken for granted (Löfgren, 1989). Furthermore, the narratives of the identities of territories may remain even when the territorial identities of their inhabitants change. Collective identities are not static, even though their main function is to create continuity. Each generation gives its own interpretations to these phenomena, and identities change. Collective identities are therefore socially constructed and historically contingent. This is particularly the case with nations, which constitute the most powerful imagined, narrated communities (Anderson, 1991; Bhabha, 1990; Guibernau, 1996).

One aim of this paper is to expand the idea of banal nationalism to point not merely to specific forms of national representations or material culture. The interesting question is how these national representations become spatialized and institutionalized forms of identity discourse, that is, how national ideals impregnate such institutions as education the media, national defense, sport, religion, etc. I am particularly interested in how these institutions reproduce the forms of territoriality and power that are structured in the very existence of these institutions. It is typical
that these institutions exist simultaneously, so that the media are in a crucial position in giving a nationalist shape to (or territorializing) sport events or national defense rhetoric. Similarly, the teaching of various subjects in schools effectively produces images of territoriality. They constitute a crucial basis for the spatial socialization process.

The major function of institutions is typically to establish stable structures for human interaction, to reduce uncertainty and increase ontological security. Institutions may of course vary a lot in nature. North (1990) points out that formal rules in a society may change rapidly as a consequence of political or judicial decisions, whereas informal constraints embedded in customs, traditions and codes of conduct are considerably more impervious to deliberate policies. Both types of institutions are significant as far as the discourses and practices of national identity are concerned. The institutionalization of territories as ‘homes’ or sources of identification consists of the emergence of territorial boundaries, symbols and institutions that together make the territory ‘exist’ in different institutional practices and in social consciousness.

Identity and Ideology

Billig (1995) states that one should not ask ‘What is national identity?’ but ‘What does it mean to claim to have a national identity?’ It is therefore crucial to reflect how discourses and representations of (national) identity are created and whose ‘plots’ dominate the narratives through which the nation is represented. The idea of national identity, particularly when it is generated and maintained by the existing states, therefore comes very close to the concept of ideology, and specifically the ideology of constructing territorial inclusions and exclusions on various spatial scales. In this sense ideology points to the process of producing meanings, signs and values in socio-spatial life—the process of signification (Paasi, 1996). The link between ideology and discourses of national identity, and thus the social practices through which these discourses become materialized, is based on the fact that these discourses are crucial instruments of social integration and control. They are therefore also linked with the physical and symbolic violence that each state practices to maintain social control and various forms of social integration (Paasi, 1997).

Ideology is not merely a set of ideas or beliefs, but rather a complicated set of social practices and rituals that manifest themselves in the ideological state apparatus. It is well known that national ideologies, discourses and practices of national identity exist in numerous ways in contemporary societies. Without committing ourselves too deeply to the structuralist and economistic framework of Althusser (1984) we can note that his examples of the ideological state apparatus provide a general framework which can be re-thought contextually in each national case. He makes a distinction between various ideological state apparatuses: religious (the system of various churches), educational (private and public schools), family, jurisdictional, political (the political system and parties), professional, communication (the media) and cultural (literature, art, sport).
It is obvious that many of these institutions operate, to employ the expressions of Bourdieu (1998), in the field of *symbolic economy*, which—by contrast with ‘rational’ material economy—points to the exchange of symbolic goods and ‘gifts’. Bourdieu reminds us that symbolic ‘work’ is simultaneously both an act of ‘form giving’ and ‘following the rules’ and that each social group requires that when one’s individual human dignity and ‘basic values of the soul’ are cherished, the human dignity of others will also be respected and the rules of the community accepted. The idea of symbolic exchange points to a specific deference, a social relation that converts power relations into moral ones (Paasi, 1996). Symbolic change is possible only if participants have identical categories for observations and appreciation. People identify themselves with collective institutions only if they feel that they will also benefit from this symbolic exchange.

Ideological institutions make a difference, however. Althusser reminds us that the ideological apparatuses of the state are characterized by multiplicity and are located partly in the private sphere. We may well think that it is through these diverging institutions that different ideas of national space and its boundaries are produced and reproduced and various constellations of power relations exist (cf. Newman and Paasi, 1998). For sure, the state makes a difference in the ways in which these elements may operate. This holds good for the ideas of national identity, too. Some nationalizing institutions are based on voluntary symbolic exchange (e.g. visits to national art galleries), while others have suppressing power in modifying social action, that is they operate through the institution of symbolic violence while being simultaneously deeply material. This is the case with such fairly permanent institutions as law, national education and the army, for instance. Innovations like citizens’ armies or state-run educational, welfare and taxation systems are ideas that can be shared in a global cultural flow, as well as representing material patterns of activity (Calhoun, 1997).

**Dimensions of National Identity**

Actually there is no such general phenomenon as ‘national identity’. Even though it is typical for some scholars to set forth elements that are included in it (Smith, 1991), these listings are always generalizations. What identity discourses mean in different states and in what social and cultural practices they manifest themselves, is always a constellation of certain general elements plus typically some other elements that may not be included in this list at all. The idea simply means different things in different spatial and temporal contexts. Anyhow, as geographers, we may perhaps think that national identity discourses include the following temporal and spatial dimensions, which help to make choices, make the relationships with others possible and give strength and resilience (cf. Guibernau, 1996):

- Spatialization of the nation, i.e., the construction of the practices of territoriality in discourses dealing with culture, nature, landscapes, boundaries and security;
Historialization of the nation, i.e., construction of its past, present and future.

These basic dimensions are often combined in the symbolic narratives and material iconographies of a nation, and some other 'building materials' of national identity discourses and practices may be distinguished within them, elements that are partly overlapping and may have different meanings on various spatial scales:

- A material-morphological basis, i.e., physical nature and landscape, which may be transformed into 'national landscapes' of literature, paintings and poetry;
- The history of human and natural relations, i.e., the history of work, which often means teleological explanations of how we have come to be what we are;
- Communal institutions in economics, administration and governance, politics, culture and traditions;
- Systems of territorial and national symbolism, including language and dialects, symbolic boundaries between 'us' and 'them' (cf. Barth, 1969; Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995).
- Values and norms;
- (At times conflicting) narratives of 'us' and 'our' identity that are recycled and modified by national literature, newspapers and education, particularly in history and geography.

**Identity As a Set of Narratives: Nationalizing Everyday Life**

The construction of social communities, their boundaries and identities, and their limits of exclusion and inclusion, occurs through narratives that aim at binding a group together and distinguishing it from other groups (Paasi, 1996). Through social narratives people come to know and make sense of the social world, and also constitute their identities (cf. Somers, 1994; Campbell, 1998). The construction of identity narratives is a political action, and, particularly in the case of national identities, this activity is an expression of the distribution of social power in society. The division of labor is crucial in this respect, since some people and groups are more involved in the production of these narratives than others.

National narratives are sets of verbal, symbolic or behavioral acts that may create temporal and spatial continuities and demarcations, may help to localize memory and meaning, can confirm that something has happened and can indicate how 'we' are in relation to these events. As far as space is concerned, these narratives typically represent events and episodes that occur on different historical and spatial scales (cf. Boyarin, 1994). Narratives of nation are effective instruments of historical memory, and they often bring some part of the past into the present and may project it into the future. They are also media that transform spatial experience that has been built to represent larger spatial scale events (national) into local systems of symbols, and therefore may give substance to practices and discourses that manifest
these larger events. Since identities are narrative constructs, a rhetorical, persuasive element forms part of them. National discourses and practices may simultaneously be territorial (exclusive) and lay stress on internal integration (inclusive). The distinction between these practices is of course diffused, and it is perhaps best to accentuate the simultaneity of the production of ideas regarding ‘us’ and ‘the Other’ and the power relations that are involved in these practices.

Identity and Scale

Territorial identities form a continuum from personal and local to larger scales. National identity is usually particularly significant. The broader the spatial scale is, the more symbolic and non-personal identities are from the perspective of daily life. Spatial identities are therefore flexible, which must be based on their hierarchical nature and their connection with practices and discourses, norms and values, which are not unambiguously local or non-local. Fitting illustrations of such elements are religious values or those linked with ideas of national landscape, nature or culture (Paasi, 1997). An interesting question is therefore how and by whom specific elements that are actually linked with various spatial scales have been chosen to represent what is understood as national.

While national identities may be regarded as expressions of social consciousness and collective memory, the dimensions of identity and the meanings of history and heritage become much more complicated in everyday life. Even if identities may be strongly represented in the form of abstract or concrete ‘official’ symbols such as flags, anthems, memorial days, statues or certain ‘national’ constructions and buildings (capital city, museums, art galleries), the meanings of the symbols may vary a lot. This is due to the fact that while symbols are typically state-engendered, they are always being interpreted in daily life, where they receive their banal meanings. In this sense, local experience mediates national identities (Cohen, 1982). It is also obvious that the power of national identity does not emerge from national symbols as such, but from the fusion of social action and symbols in ‘national’ practices and discourses (Paasi, 1997). The meanings of national symbols, such as flags, emerge from rituals and ceremonies in which such symbols are used, rather than from the symbols themselves. Most days on which flags are used, for instance, typically commemorate national heroes, literary figures, independence, war events and military forces.

National ceremonies and days when flags are flown are significant in reproducing the past of a nation and its collective memory, but their meanings are more profound, inasmuch as they actually transform collective representations of ‘national feelings’ and past national figures and events into spectacles. In this process, identity manifests itself in celebrations, musical performances, parades or speeches given by politicians—even the talks given at academic conferences (Paasi, 1997). It is very typical that these events circulate back into the day-to-day lives of people on the pages of newspapers and on television and in this process arouse images of a
common national past. The media have played a key role in the nationalization of culture, but they also open up territorial contexts to broader influences.

TWO EXAMPLES OF NATIONALIZING INSTITUTIONS

Two specific institutions will be evaluated to illustrate the nationalization of everyday life: the army and education. These are good examples of the symbolic and physical violence that is part of the practices that create and maintain national identity, construct territoriality and various forms of inclusion and exclusion. The obligatory nature of these institutions in Finland becomes clear in two expressions, oppivelvollisuus (compulsory education/school attendance) and asevelvollisuus (conscription), where the word velvollisuus means, literally, a duty. The first of these institutions is based on symbolic violence, and the second on both symbolic and physical violence. I will briefly discuss both of these institutions to illustrate the complexity of the ideas behind them and to indicate how various dimensions of territorial identity, narrative and scale are part of their operation.

Education

Education and the media are perhaps the two major institutional forms of ideological reproduction in the modern state and nation. Most studies of the history and development of nationalism emphasize the role of education and the comprehensive school system in the emergence and maintenance of a modern state (Anderson, 1991; Schleicher, 1993; Guibernau, 1996). The different forms of education have been crucial in the service of nationalism and by the latter part of the 19th century many industrialized countries had absorbed a large proportion of their children into the school system. While scholars do not always agree on the historical roles of mass education in the development of nationalism (see Smith, 1998), most of them identify its crucial meaning in the construction and reproduction of the (imagined) national community. Regardless of the prevailing social system, education is the main institution in building social integration in modern states.

Schleicher (1993) writes that when states organized schools and education, they inculcated their self-perceptions and socio-political ideologies in the young. In this process state education implanted national ideals into education, ideals which were sometimes grounded in liberal ideas and sometimes in imperialist goals. Schleicher notes that even today it is typical in most countries to pay considerable attention to ‘national core values’ via school curricula and textbooks or by effectively bringing national symbols into the classroom.

This was also the case in Finland, where the establishment of the primary school network contributed greatly to the rise of a national identity, the self-portrait of Finnishness and the understanding of the territorial structure of the state. The official curriculum for geography teaching continually stresses the promotion of a Finnish national identity and knowledge of the country’s natural and cultural features, spa-
tial structure and boundaries. States thus play a crucial role in the popular politics of territory making and in the creation of naturalized links between peoples and places (cf. Gupta and Ferguson, 1992).

Education becomes one important medium in the governance of the national space. It is therefore important to emphasize the 'pedagogy of space' in spatial socialization, that is the role of school geography in the creation of spatial representations, regional narratives, knowledge, images and stereotypes regarding the 'national character', cultures or identities of 'we' and 'them' (Paasi, 1998). Spatial representations are socially constructed, not merely taken for granted as expressions of the supposed isomorphic relations between space and culture. The images created and mediated by texts (written texts, photographs, maps) have varied a lot in the course of time and in different societies. Textbooks used in schools are an effective part of a state's socializing system and inculcate youngsters with the society's values and traditions and its political and social culture. As part of the latter, they also socialize children's classifications of territories, particularly nation-states or nations, 'imagined communities', as Anderson (1991) labels them (cf. Eriksen, 1993).

Besides being collections of regional knowledge, textbooks of geography are one mirror of the dominant ideologies of a nation(-state), they are crucial in the construction of the narrative of a nation (cf. Bhabha, 1990). Their analysis reveals what kinds of self-portrait, including visions of the Other, have been found legitimate when defining the goals and content of national education, what representations are taken as 'natural'. Books are therefore one expression of societal conditions and represent the 'regimes of truth' (Foucault, 1980) that prevail in a society and are employed in the construction and control of its social consciousness. It is therefore crucial to comprehend the social conditions which prevailed at the time when the books were written and the divergent forms of education that they define. Textbooks can be an important medium in shaping social consciousness, and various forms of 'gate-keeping' and exclusion may occur on their pages. Forms of control may take place through censorship, 'active forgetting' or simply through the production of false images. Control may also be a consequence of inadequate knowledge.

National stereotyping has been a problem in education for a long time, and it is not unusual even today to find stereotyping in textbooks that supports inclusion and exclusion between national groups and therefore favors nationalism in education. The narratives of Finland and the Finns have varied in the course of time, but the stereotypes have mainly been positive ones (Paasi, 1998). The 'Finn' has been constructed on different spatial scales, so that the inhabitants of Finnish provinces (referred to as 'tribes') constituted the first spatial scale, being united to create the image of the 'true Finn'. The 'other' constructed in the books has similarly varied, but the western European countries have typically been much more favorably represented than those located outside Europe. The most deprecatory stereotypes presented have referred to African people.

It would be important to expand this analysis to other fields of education, too. In Finland the songbooks used in schools, for instance, seem to be organized 'spatially'
in the same way as geography books. On a regional scale, most Finnish provinces have their own songs, characterizing the stereotypes that have been linked with the inhabitants of these areas since the 19th century. The whole Finnish nation is also represented in a number of songs, particularly in the famous Finlandia hymn and the national anthem ‘Our land’. The links between the citizens and collective national duties are often present in songs as well. Perhaps the most illustrative text is ‘the Song of the Athenians’, which begins very dramatically: ‘It is the duty of youngsters to die for their country’.

**Military Practices as Instruments of Nationalism**

Smith (1998) writes that our modern world is one of national competition and warfare, and for this reason military factors and militarism assume an increasingly significant role in the distribution of resources and the formation of political communities and identities. Similarly, national defense is understood as being one of the major elements in the idea of sovereignty, which is effectively symbolized in states (cf. Miller, 1995). Many authors (Anthony Giddens, Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, for instance) have put particular stress on the role of military factors and war in state-making and the emergence of modern nationalism. Nationalism, national identity and war therefore have close mutual connections. Posen (1995) points out that given that so much curiosity about nationalism is driven by its apparent association with war, it is significant that few scholars have tried directly to connect the two phenomena. He further notes that whereas the rich literature on the origins of nationalism addresses the processes of political, social and economic development that have affected the formation of national identities, it pays relatively little attention to war.

Violence, wars and the threat posed by the existence of a huge neighbor, Russia, later the leading socialist superpower, the Soviet Union, and again, from the early 1990s onwards, Russia, have also occupied a crucial position in shaping Finnish national narratives—and not only narratives but also diverging military practices. Images of exclusion and threat, in different forms, have been part of the national narrative, ‘together with traditional foreign policy discourses, the rhetoric of immigration officials, and so forth. A well-known Finnish author, Paavo Haavikko, has depicted the whole Finnish nation-building process in the words: ‘The state, economy, culture and nation are a whole—created by the threat of Russia—which has prevailed for the last hundred years’ (cited in Paasi, 1996:306).

The territorial power and control of the state manifest themselves not only in the border areas but also in places or landscapes in which violence, the possibility of violence or memories of past violence and war are implicitly or explicitly present. Typical examples include such elements as national military practices (army, parades), military memorials and cemeteries, or official days when flags are flown. Statues of military heroes or memorials to an unknown soldier transform the past into allegorical form to represent ‘Us’. Battlefields are also becoming increasingly significant sites of territorialized memory, and typically occupy a visible position in the
national iconography. They are therefore essential instruments in the nationalization of the landscape and in visualizing the narratives of the Nation (Paasi, 1997, 1999). It may therefore be argued that ritual is one of the keywords in understanding the links between nationalism and war.

All these elements have deep institutional roots. In principle all of them are connected with the idea of offering or preparing to offer oneself in war for a collective ideal that is greater than the individual, and they form one part of the moralizing aspect of the state which the sociologist Émile Durkheim, for example, saw as one of its major functions. As Gottmann (1973) has pointed out, the principle of dying for one's country had already been accepted in some parts of Western Europe by the 15th century, likewise the link between the defense of a country, a specific piece of territory, and the defense of a faith. This idea is still deeply embodied in military and religious practices that effectively symbolize, produce and reproduce territoriality and boundaries, endowing them with a transcendental aura. In many states the national army, often linked to a religious rhetoric, has a fundamental role in national socialization. The fact that Finland's history has been a history of conflicts puts emphasis on military aspects as a source of national identity (cf. Miller, 1995). One expression of the significance of war is the major role of war novels in Finnish literature.

This is by no means a unique situation, since all states transform past victories and defeats into abstract narratives and concrete landscapes of memories where people belonging to various generations can, in specific local contexts, acquaint themselves with the national aura. Quite another story concerns military practices in which people are directly socialized as part of the war machine. This is the case particularly in states, which have compulsory military service. Falah and Newman (1995) emphasize the role of compulsory military service in Israel as a significant institution of national socialization, and the army has similarly been a powerful mechanism for socialization in Finland. The Finnish army was established soon after independence, in the spring of 1918. It operates on a clear regional basis, its three command areas and 11 military provinces providing a subnational basis for organizing its activities. Under Finnish legislation, all males are obliged to perform military service for a period currently varying from 180 days to 362 days. Some 33,000 males reach the military age of 17 years annually, and more than 80% of each age group enter military service. A further 30,000 men take part in military refresher courses every year.

People liable to military service can alternatively enlist for unarmed military service or community service on religious or ethical grounds. Community service lasts for almost 400 days, which means that it is twice as long as the shortest period of military service. In choosing this policy, Finland was not following the Western European model, but rather it places the country among a group of Eastern European states that includes Bulgaria, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and the Ukraine. Amnesty International has recently criticized Finland and pointed out that the longer community service alternative implies a punishment for people who refuse
to go to military service. Ironic enough, the current Minister of Defense, Mrs. Anneli Taina, representing the right-wing Coalition Party, has suggested that this alternative should actually be even longer. Some 2,700 men annually choose this alternative. A major public debate on the topic arose recently when the son of Martti Ahtisaari, the current President—and thus supreme commander of the Finnish Army—decided to choose community service. An expansion of nationalizing military practices has taken place in the sense that women can now enlist for military service on a voluntary basis, whereupon their conditions of service are governed by the same rules as for men. The number of women taking up this option has remained very low, however, only a few hundred per year.

Military discourses were very powerful in Finland during the existence of the Soviet Union, and even though Finnish military power was restricted under the Paris Peace Treaty (1947), the media maintained a continual discourse on the existence of a strong will for national defense. After the Soviet collapse and Finland’s entry into the European Union, the Finns still prefer to remain non-aligned, even though the image of NATO has improved relative to earlier times. According to a recent survey, the army is one of the most respected social institutions in society, which must partly reflect current security discourses, which still contain old images of the enemy, reminding people of the fact that the constant articulation of danger is a ‘condition of possibility’ for the identity of the state (Campbell, 1992). According to a survey carried out in summer 1998, four of every five Finns are in support of compulsory military service, particularly those living in rural areas in Northern and Eastern Finland, those who have a minimum level of education and those who support the conservatives or central party. Voluntary military service gains support from younger urban Finns and from adherents to the green and left-wing parties. Discussions of membership of the WEU and NATO and the current opinions of leading politicians in favor of non-alliance and continued reliance on the role of the national defense forces are also apt to place emphasis on the national role of the army.

Military practices are often effectively bound up with other national practices. Religion, for instance, has for a long time been one crucial element in the service of the ideology of nationalism. Myths of a ‘chosen people’ have been exploited by many states. In Finland, for instance, religion became a very important instrument in supporting military activities during World War II (Paasi, 1996). This link is also deeply ingrained in the contemporary Finnish Army. One’s obligations to the state are expressed very powerfully in the Soldier’s Oath that new conscripts have to swear. This runs as follows:

I, N.N., will promise and affirm, in front of the Almighty and Omniscient, to be a reliable and faithful citizen of Finland. I wish to serve my country honestly and to the best of my ability, to its benefit. Everywhere and in all occasions, during peace and war, I undertake to defend its legitimate social order and legally constituted authorities. If I discover or learn about anything taking place with the aim of over-
throwing the legal authorities or the social order of the country, I undertake to inform the authorities immediately. All this I undertake, on my honor and conscience, to discharge—so help me God.

DISCUSSION

While nationalism and national identity have become crucial in contemporary cultural and social sciences, little attention has been devoted to the meanings of these categories in daily life. The major aim of this paper has been to conceptualize the discourses and social practices that express and reproduce nationalism and national identity. Its other task has been to evaluate how these broader social practices become part of everyday routine and experience. The paper was aimed at showing that the concept of ideology is important for understanding the link between the ‘social’ and the ‘individual’. Discourses and practices of identity (particularly collective identity) and ideology thus come together in numerous social practices and discourses.

Two types of institutions, military and educational, are evaluated here to show how this ‘mediation’ occurs. As far as their roles in the construction of nationalism, national identity and territoriality are concerned, these institutions have numerous elements, aims and ritual aspects in common. Nevertheless the manifestations and meanings of these are always historically and spatially contingent. This means that different military and educational practices exist in each state and that the roles of these institutions in the construction of territoriality vary, as do their meanings in everyday life.

The exclusive forms of territoriality are increasingly being challenged in the contemporary world, and instead of one state territoriality it is perhaps better to talk about territorialities (Paasi, 1999). This is particularly obvious in Europe, where some scholars have been ready to talk about a ‘new medievalism’ typified by overlapping authorities and contested loyalties between nation-states and other agencies (Anderson, 1996). This territorial order is characterized by flows of people (immigrants, refugees), ideas, money, etc., which again means that the world of politics is becoming more polycentric and the idea of governance is increasingly expanding beyond that of the control exercised by sovereign nation-states. Political boundaries become simultaneously more ambiguous and contested (cf. Shapiro, 1997). People’s territorial identities are also increasingly being understood as changing, dynamic and polyvocal categories, rather than being linked with fixed, unchanging spaces of exclusion.

Many scholars argue, however, that the nation-state will maintain its position in the control of its borders and in governance. This also means that nationalism and national identity will continue to have a role in the service of the state in the future. National education in schools, usually providing clear codes, symbols and practices for national culture, will not disappear. This means that there are many important
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challenges for geographers in studying the nationalist content of educational materials. History and geography textbooks, and also books on national literature, may be rich sources for scholars trying to map how nationalism and discourses of national identity become part of everyday life and national socialization. Similarly, numerous military practices will continue in the future to maintain the images of threat, defense and ‘us’ (Shapiro, 1997). It is a challenge for researchers to study how the roles of military organizations and military power as macro-scale phenomena are changing in the contemporary world, but it is also crucial to evaluate how this takes place in everyday life, both nationally and locally. It is hence challenging to study how nationalist ideologies, identity discourses and territoriality are constituted in and through military practices.

REFERENCES


