Globalization and the Scales of Citizenship

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New levels, sites, and structures of governance are being created in response to processes of globalization, with implications for the assumptions that locate citizenship within nation-states. In this paper, I argue that the reconfiguration and relocation of citizenship is multi-layered and scaled. The reconfiguration of formal and substantive aspects of citizenship is not linear, in that the ability to guarantee rights and meet responsibilities does not uniformly increase or decrease as one moves across scales. The new spatiality of citizenship that is emerging is one in which the political opportunity structure of scale interacts with structures and practices embedded in the nation-state. The geography of citizenship, then, is organized around both scale and territory. I examine this new geography of citizenship and the possibilities for individuals to act as citizens that it entails using the example of transnational migrants.

Keywords: Globalization, scale, formal citizenship, substantive citizenship, deterritorialization, transnational migrants.

The pairing of the terms globalization and citizenship makes some people expect either a rehashing of the 'decline of the nation-state' thesis or a naïve call for global civil society and citizenship. Both arguments invoke a world without borders in which nation-states play a diminished role. Deterritorialization is apparently in store for us all (e.g., Lipschultz, 1992; Elkins, 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Wapner, 1995).

While it is easy to dismiss some of these arguments, it is true that the Westphalian system of nation-states is changing. New levels, sites, and structures of governance are being created, with implications for the assumptions that locate citizenship within nation-states. The European Union is the most obvious example in this regard, but it is not the only one. Transnational migration also challenges the structures of citizenship as questions are raised about the implications for democratic governance and accountability when large numbers of residents are formally excluded from citizenship (Brubaker, 1989; Hammar, 1990). Other processes of globalization have eroded the ability (and willingness) of nation-states to guarantee the substantive rights of citizenship, including the economic and social rights described by Marshall (1950). If these rights are to be met, then it is important to look beyond the nation-state as a location for citizenship.

In this paper, I argue that the reconfiguration and relocation of citizenship is multi-layered and scaled. Using Kevin Cox' (1998) notions of 'spaces of dependence' and 'spaces of engagement', I demonstrate the ways that formal and substan-
tive citizenship are reworked at the local, national, and transnational scales. The reconfiguration is not linear, in that the ability to guarantee rights and meet responsibilities does not uniformly increase or decrease as one moves across scales. The new spatiality of citizenship that is emerging is one in which the political opportunity structure of scale interacts with structures and practices embedded in the nation-state. The geography of citizenship, then, is organized around both scale and territory.

In making this argument, I am clearly not following those who argue that the nation-state is unimportant or that deterritorialization is complete (e.g., Elkins, 1995; Ohmae, 1995). I am arguing instead that there is a tension—a shifting balance—between processes and powers that are territorially rooted and those that are not, due to transitions in terms of the opportunities for various forms of political action related to citizenship and for various social groups at different scales. My argument is, thus, neither an empirical one that citizenship is becoming less important, nor is it a normative one that citizenship should be located at a single scale. Rather, I argue that the possibilities to act as citizens—to bear the rights and responsibilities of citizenship—reflect political opportunity structures in which scales other than the nation-state are significant. These political opportunity structures are created through the interactions of processes of globalization (or deterritorialization) with territorially-rooted institutions and practices. I should note, as well, that the argument that I present may be most applicable to countries within the core of the world system. Prior to the most recent round of globalization, these countries seemed better able to determine their fate than countries on the periphery that were controlled for years by colonial powers, dependence, and debt. Furthermore, it is in the mature democracies of the core that ideas of citizenship have been most developed (Dahl, 1989), and it is on the basis of these countries’ experiences that the theories I discuss have been developed. While the core countries may not represent the experiences of all countries, the core countries have been held as an example of democracy and citizenship for other countries to follow (Dahl, 1989; Huntington, 1991), and they have been instrumental in setting international norms and cultures of citizenship (Meyer et al., 1997).

The paper is organized in four sections. The first three sections provide brief overviews of the challenges to citizenship as commonly understood and the characteristics of citizenship and globalization that spawned those challenges. The final, and longest, section of the paper presents a conceptualization of the scaled nature of citizenship and of the formal and substantive nature of citizenship for social groups at each scale. In making this argument, I focus on transnational migrants as a group that is emblematic of the processes of globalization and the challenges to citizenship that globalization poses. The paper is primarily conceptual in nature, however. The use of transnational migrants is intended to provide an example through which my argument about the emerging spatiality of citizenship and the importance of scale may be made more concrete and clear; the example is not used to provide empirical ‘proof’ of the argument.
CHALLENGES TO CITIZENSHIP

The prerogative of controlling access to a political community, of deciding who can be a member, and of defining the rights and responsibilities of members has been linked to the nation-state since at least the 18th century. As such, citizenship has been held to be defined at the level of and to be most relevant to the nation-state (Lister, 1997; Holston and Appadurai, 1999). In controlling who has access to membership, however, the nation-state constructs a citizenship that is exclusive at its very core (Shklar, 1991; Held, 1995; McGrew, 1997). This exclusivity stands in contrast to the ideals of universalism and equality that the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘citoyen’ conjure. The contemporary challenges to citizenship posed by globalization highlight the particular and differentiated character of citizenship and the limited ability of the nation-state to define and maintain formal and substantive aspects of citizenship. Consider the following examples.

Transnational migration—caused by the search for jobs or education, flight from war or catastrophe, or simply a reflection of the increasingly footloose lifestyles of some individuals—has created a situation in which noncitizens constitute a large portion of the population of many countries. In some countries, noncitizens may apply for citizenship, but in others, obtaining citizenship is difficult (de Rahm, 1990; Hammar, 1990; Layton-Henry, 1990; Soysal, 1994; Leitner, 1997). The challenge posed by this situation is practical and normative. It is a fundamental problem when democracies include large numbers of people who either cannot or will not become citizens (Brubaker, 1989; Bauböck, 1994), raising questions of representation, participation, and legitimacy.

Like transnational migration, communications and information technologies have the potential to create new communities and identities that really do span national boundaries (Morely and Robins, 1995). Some scholars have anticipated that these technologies may decrease the relevance of the nation-state as a site of loyalty to which allegiance is pledged. Many of these scholars (e.g., Held, 1995; McGrew, 1997; Cheah and Robbins, 1998) discuss the possibility of a new cosmopolitanism that will link humans in a globalized civil society with citizenship vested in something other than the nation-state.

Concerns over human rights also pose a challenge to ideas of citizenship based in nation-states. International conventions and agreements hold signatory states responsible for upholding internationally-defined norms, and these norms are sometimes in conflict with culturally-defined roles and national ideals (Falk, 1995; Meyer, et al., 1997). These conflicts are perhaps most often mentioned as they relate to the rights of women and of ethnic minorities (Lister, 1997; Prügl and Meyer, 1999). The discourse of human rights challenges the idea that rights are somehow national or should be contingently defined based on discrete national origins. While the idea of ‘global citizenship’ seems hopelessly naïve to some, the stripping of citizenship and identities of Kosovar refugees during the NATO bombing campaign in 1999 points to the dangers that can arise in systems in which citizenship is defined solely
by nation-states (Bauböck, 1994; Jacobson, 1997). As such, internationally-defined norms and conventions around human rights can be used to pressure nation-states to change their citizenship practices, with implications for state sovereignty. Even when overt pressure is not used, these internationally-defined norms narrow the range of options that nation-states consider with respect to citizenship and the treatment of individuals within their territories (Meyer et al., 1997).

Finally, globalization challenges nation-state citizenship because of its effects on cities. Holston and Appadurai (1999) argue that globalization has driven a wedge between cities and nation-states and that cities have a different relation to globalization processes than do nation-states. The 'glocalization' of economic processes (Swyngedouw, 1989) creates new opportunities for cities that by-pass structures and institutions of nation-states in important ways (Preteceilli, 1990; Sassen, 1999; K. Cox, 1997; Clarke and Gaile, 1998). In terms of citizenship, these new relations between cities, nation-states, and the global economy mean that some aspects of citizenship are shaped by conditions and relations in cities, while other aspects remain determined by the nation-state. This is precisely the sort of interaction between globalization processes and territorially-rooted institutions that creates a new, scalar political opportunity structure for citizenship struggles. In response to these new opportunities, social movements in many cities attempt to redefine citizenship in transnational terms (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Holston and Appadurai, 1999).

Taken together, these challenges suggest that citizenship is reconfigured—or at least contested—as a result of the interactions between globalization processes and the territorial nature of the nation-state. This reconfiguration creates a new spatiality of citizenship in which political opportunity structures provided through both scale and nation-states play critical roles. But the elements of citizenship that are reconfigured and the aspects of globalization that are significant to this process require specification. It is to these issues that I now turn.

CONCEPTS OF CITIZENSHIP

The previous comments invoke debates over the meaning of citizenship. In particular, three aspects of citizenship are debated: 1) the roles of formal and substantive citizenship; 2) the importance of rights, responsibilities, and participation in an active, meaningful citizenship; and 3) the roles that social groups play in defining citizenship. The following paragraphs provide a brief outline of the debates surrounding these aspects of citizenship and provide hints as to the way citizenship is affected by globalization.

Formal and Substantive Citizenship

Formal citizenship refers to the legal category that nation-states define. A citizen of a nation-state is entitled to certain rights (e.g., voting, welfare entitlements) and is expected to fulfill certain responsibilities (e.g., taxes, military services), although
the specifics of these rights and responsibilities vary from country to country. Substantive aspects of citizenship refer to the ability to act as a citizen and to be respected as one. Substantive citizenship is affected by much more than a set of legal conditions or characteristics. It is shaped by the material and ideological conditions in a society that enable people to function with some degree of autonomy, to formulate political ideas, and to act on those ideas. These conditions are shaped at a variety of scales, but may be experienced most directly at the local level. Thus, human rights conventions have argued that recognition of women as citizens requires two sets of changes. Recognition requires, first, that nation-states implement formal structures designating women as citizens independent of their families, and second, it requires changes in material and ideological conditions to empower the substantive aspects of women's citizenship. These changes often imply actions at the local level as sites where the economic, political, and social relations that directly affect well-being and the substantive aspects of citizenship are experienced (Staeheli and Cope, 1994; Staeheli and Clarke, 1995; Lister, 1997; Steinstra, 1999).

Rights, Responsibilities, and Participation

Closely aligned with issues related to formal and substantive aspects of citizenship are issues related to the rights and responsibilities conferred by citizenship and participation as a citizen in a political community. Liberal citizenship tends to a rights-based conceptualization in which the formal rights of citizenship are highlighted. These rights have been defined by nation-states and are supposed to be defended through the institutions of governance. International and supranational organizations, however, play expanding roles in defining these rights, as noted previously. In contrast to liberal theory, republican theories of citizenship highlight the responsibilities of citizens, such as paying taxes, serving on juries, and participating in decision-making. In practice, rights and responsibilities can be hard to differentiate or may be context-dependent. Citizens of the United States, for example, groan at the thought of jury duty as an onerous responsibility or burden. In other contexts, however, jury duty may be seen as an important means by which the right to equal treatment in the justice system is ensured.

If globalization (through international norms and human rights discourses) has been important in shaping and expanding notions of rights, then globalization has also been important in conditioning the ability of citizens to fulfill their responsibilities. The effect of globalization on citizens is varied, with the greatest impact on those whose income is less stable, who have to work longer hours to meet basic survival needs of their household, and/or who do not have the basic democratic literacy to participate in political activities (Sirianni, 1991; Smith, 1989; Sassen, 1991).

Participation in decision-making and governance is one of the most important responsibilities of citizens. As Sandel (1996) argues, the ability to fulfill responsibilities is shaped by political economic structures that allow (or do not allow) effective participation in all aspects of a democratic society; he terms this the 'political economy of citizenship'. Sandel and others (e.g., Gould, 1988) have argued that a democratic
political economy requires a democratization of all aspects of life—the workplace, the home, the society—and not just the institutions associated with formal politics and government.

The political economy of citizenship, and the concomitant implications for substantive citizenship, has been profoundly affected by globalization; the changes are located in the ability and willingness of states to provide the conditions under which citizens can participate effectively in governance. These conditions include universal education, stable incomes, a political climate in which large numbers of individuals or groups are not systematically excluded or alienated, and a social safety net that ensures the basic well-being of citizens (Marshall, 1950; Sandel, 1996). As will be demonstrated later, globalization processes are implicated in the changing ability of states to ensure these conditions. To the extent that these conditions are met, it is increasingly through institutions other than the nation-state (Holston and Appadurai, 1999).

**Individuals and Social Groups**

Underlying all of the issues described above is a fundamental tension or contradiction in citizenship. Liberal and republican theories hold that the rights and responsibilities of citizenship are borne by individuals, but the political reality is that citizenship is extended to social groups. That is, when nation-states set the rules of entry to citizenship, the debate is about the characteristics of social groups, not about individuals who might wish to become citizens. So while theories of politics may assume individual agents, social groups and perceptions about group members as political subjects are important to understanding who is a citizen and who may exercise the rights of citizenship. This is the basis of many radical and feminist critiques of citizenship theory (e.g., Pateman 1989; Fraser, 1990; Mouffe, 1992; Brown, 1997; but contrast Soysal, 1994). Struggles over citizenship, then, are only partially about the inclusion of individuals in a polity; they are also about the standing of social groups within it (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Shklar, 1991; Brown, 1997). The final section of the paper examines the ways in which globalization has transformed the construction of citizenship for one social group—transnational migrants. Before examining this issue, however, a final conceptual point related to citizenship must be addressed. This issue involves the scales at which citizenship is constructed, contested, and given meaning.

**GLOBALIZATION, DETERITORIALIZATION, AND THE REARTICULATION OF SCALE**

Of the many aspects of globalization that have been debated, the most significant for my purposes are deterritorialization and the configuration of scale as they affect capacities of nation-states. This section examines theoretical arguments regarding the construction of scale as they relate to globalization, deterritorialization, and the
nation-state; this discussion provides a basis for the analysis of the changing scales of citizenship that follows.

It is perhaps easiest to think of scales as hierarchical or nested and of the possibility of moving up or down a system of scales comprised of the local, national, and global. This imagery has provided a powerful heuristic in introductions to political geography. Contemporary theory and research on scale, however, has argued that scales are not neatly nested (Swyngedouw, 1997) and that it is possible to ‘jump’ scales (Smith, 1992). These ideas are important as we attempt to understand the ways in which local and global processes interact without significant mediation by the nation-state. In addition, other scales (e.g., the household, the region) may be important for any given problem. Scales, then, are not pre-given or pre-determined (Swyngedouw, 1997). Rather than analyzing scales as fixed, a more useful approach is to consider the ways in which processes operating at different scales interact to create conditions, opportunities and constraints that political agents confront and use. It is in this way that citizenship and the opportunities it affords may be constructed at scales other than the nation-state. For example, processes at the international and local scales are implicated in the restructuring of substantive citizenship, as described previously.

The strong globalization hypothesis (see Hirst and Thompson, 1995) holds that the globalization of capital has reduced the capacity and significance of nation-states as sites of regulation. Two components of this argument are significant here. First, following from the strong globalization hypothesis was an expectation of deterritorialization—that time-space compression either had made or would make territorially-defined states irrelevant. Capital seemed to have unparalleled ability to shift locations; indeed, as a set of flows, it didn’t even seem to occupy space (see Storper, 1997). The significance of territorially-defined states was expected to wane as a result (Elkins, 1995; Ohmae, 1995), raising issues of accountability and governance (Sassen, 1995; R. Cox, 1997; Thompson, 1997).

The strong globalization hypothesis is, however, just as its name implies—a strong statement of a hypothesis. Most scholars agree that it is overstated, and that the significance of deterritorialized flows is the ways in which they interact with territorially-rooted structures in a process of spatial change. In this process, reterritorialization and the production of scales are critical (Storper, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1997; Ö Tuathail, 1998). This means that it is necessary to examine the ways in which globalization processes interact with local contexts and with institutions that have not lost their territorial basis. For all that globalization may have led to economic processes that are not bounded by the nation-state, it is undeniable that the nation-state remains significant as a set of institutions that structures many aspects of the lives of citizens. Thus, it is important to understand the particular aspects of citizenship that are affected by globalization.

The significance of globalization processes lies in understanding the substantive and formal aspects of citizenship and the scales at which each are constructed. As nation-states have struggled to adjust to economies in which the flows of capital are
Globalization and the Scales of Citizenship

Beyond state control, the political economy of citizenship has been altered. These alterations have implications for states' abilities to ensure the substantive rights of citizens and for citizens' abilities to participate in decision-making that would regulate the political economy. In general, the formal aspects of citizenship remain located in the nation-state, although the increased importance of human rights discourses, international norms and the rise of supranational organizations have narrowed the range of the configuration of the formal aspects of citizenship within nations-states (Meyer, et al., 1997). At the same time, economic globalization has reduced the ability of nation-states to provide for the substantive aspects of citizenship (Turner, 1990). In this way, and as expanded in the next section, globalization has altered the political opportunity structure of citizenship (Jonas, 1994; Massey, 1994; Miller, 1994).

Kevin Cox (1998) has provided a way to analyze the production of scale and of opportunity described above. He proposes that we think of two scalar processes that produce 'spaces of dependence' and 'spaces of engagement'. Spaces of dependence are those sites (at different scales) in which dependence for political and economic agents is constructed. Spaces of engagement are those sites (again at different scales) in which political agents can work to address needs created through dependence and even to try to modify the forces and agents that create dependence. These sites and scales are not static, but are constantly changing due to processes of spatial change and reterritorialization. Conceptually separating spaces of dependence from spaces of engagement highlights two important conditions. First, the scales and spaces in which dependence is constructed may not be accessible to political agents who wish to influence—or to engage—their interests. Indeed, the separation suggests that political agents may make strategic decisions as to the scales and spaces in which they attempt to address the processes that construct dependence. Second, Cox' analysis suggests the importance of understanding that access to the scales of dependence and of engagement is differentiated—that some agents will have greater and lesser abilities to address political issues at different scales and in different spaces. It is to these issues that I now turn.

SCALES OF CITIZENSHIP

If the argument presented to this point holds, then we can think of citizenship as being constructed at multiple scales. At any given scale, citizenship is shaped by the interactions of processes, institutions, and agents, not all of which operate or are located at the particular scale under consideration. This is a complex idea that is best worked through using an example; as noted in the introduction, I have chosen the example of transnational migration. Transnational migrants present an important means to examine the changing nature of citizenship for several reasons. They represent a significant and increasing share of the world's population. The United Nations Development Program (1997), for example, estimated in 1997 that 2.3
percent of the world's population were transnational migrants. This figure included over 120 million individuals in 1990, up from 75 million in 1965. This figure does not, however, include off-spring of migrants that were born in the host county, but who may still be considered 'guests' or migrants. The distribution of migrants was also uneven, constituting over 4.5 percent of the population of developed countries. Further, transnational migrants accounted for nearly half of the population growth between 1990 and 1995 in developed countries as a set and for 88 percent of the population growth of Europe during the same period. These migrants form an important part of the labor pool in developed countries, filling key niches in highly-skilled and low-skilled occupations (Borjas, 1995; Smith and Edmonston, 1997). As noted earlier, transnational migrants are also particularly instructive in terms of the challenges they pose for our understanding of citizenship. They are often the subject of heated debate, for their presence brings to the foreground assumptions about who should be included in the category 'citizen' and about the implications of having large numbers of people who cannot participate in the governance of the countries from or to which they migrated (Bauböck, 1994). Finally, this group captures the tensions between the deterterritorialization and the territorially rooted nation-state (Soysal, 1994; Icduygu, 1996). The label 'transnational' highlights migrants' lack of rootedness, even as territoriality and the nation-state are intrinsic to the definition of the category or group.

In reality, transnational migrants do not constitute a coherent category, differentiated as they are by national origin, destination, class, education and skill level, gender, age, and on and on. As suggested, however, they are a particularly instructive set of people against whom the processes of globalization can be evaluated in the construction of scale and citizenship. As a group, they constitute a major force of globalization, and they represent an important challenge to the formal and substantive aspects of democratic citizenship. In discussing transnational migrants, I will often divide them into two groups based on the skill-level and/or income-level of the migrant and household. While this is a very crude distinction, it highlights the ways in which migrants are differentially affected by the migration process and their insertion into the receiving societies. Simply put, capital in the form of monetary and human resources matters to the migration process. While this analysis will obviously be limited, my hope is that the mode of analysis can be extended in more detailed, empirically informed studies dealing with a wider range and carefully nuanced set of social groups.

In the following paragraphs, I examine the construction of citizenship for transnational migrants at the international, national and local scales. It is not my intention to re-inscribe these scales as either fixed or as more important than other scales. Indeed, it will quickly become clear that movement and the networks that link the scales are necessary to my argument. I rely on these three scales, however, because they are probably the most familiar scales to geographers, and because that familiarity makes it easier to explore the three issues that I have argued are important to the construction of citizenship across scales. These three issues are: 1) the
Globalization and the Scales of Citizenship

district between spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement; 2) the distinction between formal and substantive aspects of citizenship; and 3) the ways in which citizenship is differentiated, or takes on different meanings, across social groups.

**Constructions of Citizenship at the Global Scale**

The global scale is in some ways the most obvious place to start this discussion, as migrants are both a force of globalization and a response to other globalization forces. As such, one of the spaces of dependence for transnational migrants is global. As transnational migrants move between countries, they force us to look beyond the nation-state. Yet as I have argued, citizenship is a concept and a legal category that remains firmly linked to the nation-state.

Sassen (1991, 1995), Mitchell (1993), and White (1998) have documented the experiences of ‘high-flying’ or ‘astronaut’ transnational migrants who are part of an international elite. These people are often the controllers or managers of the global economy. Mohamed Al Fayed is perhaps one of the best known examples of this type of migrant. A migrant to the United Kingdom from Egypt, he has amassed a fortune, largely through speculation in the international economy. His well-publicized struggles over citizenship demonstrate the distinction between substantive and formal aspects of the category. Fayed claims many of the substantive rights of citizenship. He owns considerable property in Britain, his family moves within the elite of British society, and he owns the venerable and quintessentially British institution of Harrod’s department store. His attempt to purchase the store led to some protest that a foreigner would control such a symbol of Britain, but attempts to block the sale failed. Fayed probably also has greater access to the institutions of the British government than do most citizens, as his involvement in the cash-for-questions scheme of the mid-1990s demonstrates. Yet he has been repeatedly refused in his quest for formal citizenship in the United Kingdom.

Fayed’s case is, of course, unique in the extent of his wealth and in the publicity surrounding his case. The broad contours of the case, however, are similar to those of many transnational migrants characterized by high incomes and/or skills. For those who work in the professional ranks of transnational corporations, TNCs have often been able to ensure the substantive rights of citizenship as a prerequisite of investing in a country (Sassen, 1995). The spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement in these situations match. Formal citizenship may be more difficult to attain, but it also seems less important for these migrants. Some surveys suggest that higher income transnational migrants to the United States do not place a high priority on attaining formal citizenship. This has variously been interpreted as a reflection of a diminished need for formal protection (Bauböck, 1994), a reduced attachment to the host country (Holston and Appadurai, 1999), or (more nefariously) a desire to obtain the substantive rights of citizenship without assuming the responsibilities that formal citizenship entails (Schuck, 1989).

By contrast, low-skilled transnational migrants and migrants who move without the protection of the forces of global capital face a very different set of issues and
conditions upon migration. The spaces of dependence for many of these people are in part global; they migrate because of shifts in the economies of their region of origin relative to the destination, because of structural adjustment policies set at the international level, or because of geopolitical conflicts between nation-states. But because these migrants lack access to the direct benefits provided to elites, they also depend very directly on the resources provided through the locality to which they migrate. As a result, their spaces of dependence are simultaneously local and global. Yet these migrants do not have the same political access as Fayed or other elites; the spaces of engagement for low-skilled migrants may therefore be localized in both the places of origin and destination. At least initially, they do not have access to formal citizenship in the receiving country and may not be able to attain it at all, and their reduced economic power may preclude them from attaining substantive rights that elite migrants have secured.

**Constructions of Citizenship at the National Level**

The ability of the nation-state to ensure the substantive rights of citizenship has experienced significant erosion due to the processes of globalization. In the developed world, nation-states have moved away from social welfare policies that guaranteed those rights through the state. Under the guise of a ‘third way’, these countries have reduced entitlements and social welfare. In the United States, this was accomplished through the Contract with America and through the policies of the Democratic Leadership Council. In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair’s ‘New Labor’ led the way. The efforts to join the European Monetary Union were instrumental in reducing social welfare expenditures in other European Countries. In all cases, the argument presented for reducing social welfare expenditures was in part about the need to keep national economies strong in the face of new global pressures; social welfare expenditures were seen as a burden that states could ill-afford. In the U.S., this argument was coupled with a discussion about the role of the national government vis-à-vis local governments in fostering the conditions under which substantive forms of citizenship could be fostered (Staeheli, Kodras, and Flint, 1997). In the developing world, social welfare programs had typically been small in size, though important to the people they served. Structural adjustment policies for these countries and for the NICs whose economies were devastated by the debt crises of the past few years, have led to slashes in social welfare expenditures in some countries and complete elimination of programs in other countries (Corbridge, 1993).

The result has been an emptying or ‘hollowing out’ of the nation-state in terms of its support for social welfare (Turner, 1990). Strange (1996) argues, however, this does not mean that the nation-state has lost its relevance to citizenship, or its relevance to other functions. Rather, what we have witnessed is a reconfiguration of scale in which the nation-state remains important as a site in which the formal aspects of citizenship are constructed and maintained, but in which responsibility for the substantive aspects of citizenship is less significant. To a limited degree, the nation-state may remain a space of engagement related to the substantive aspects of
citizenship in that debates and political pressure continue within national governments. But nation-states through much of the world have ceded their responsibility for the substantive rights of citizenship to the global and local levels. The spaces of dependence and of engagement for migrants are, thus, most often located at the global and local levels in terms of the substantive rights of citizenship, with the significance of each level varying by the skill or income level of migrants.

This discussion has focused on transnational migrants and their spaces of dependence and engagement and on the locations where they can access the substantive rights of citizenship. Across both the national and international scales, however, there are attempts by non-migrants to reconstruct the formal rights of citizenship for migrants; these efforts are often led by people whose formal citizenship status is secure. Examples of these efforts include constitutional changes in Mexico that allow dual citizenship for migrants from the country, attempts to make it easier for guest workers to attain citizenship in Germany, and discussions in international and supranational organizations to ensure that every person is guaranteed citizenship in some country (Bauböck, 1994). As a result, the ways in which immigrants are incorporated into social welfare systems and the types of protections afforded to immigrants vary between countries (Soysal, 1994). The debates within nation-states that give rise to these differences are generally carried out by people who are, themselves, citizens of the nation-state; these citizens are using a space of engagement to which they have access as a way of addressing the formal citizenship rights of non-citizens. At the international level, there are few explicit efforts to limit the ability of nation-states to set standards of citizenship (Lister, 1997). Rather, most efforts are directed at building international norms and institutions that can use moral suasion to make nation-states more inclusive in their citizenship practices (Falk, 1995). To this point, there has been little attempt to create a transnational or global citizen with formal rights and responsibilities.

Constructions of Citizenship at the Local Level

The local scale has not been a major site affecting formal citizenship, either as a space of dependence or a space of engagement. The significance of the local scale is in terms of the ways it shapes the substantive aspects of citizenship. As a space of dependence, the local does not stand alone, linked as it is to the national level and increasingly to the global in terms of economic conditions. Yet even as control over the economy is increasingly extra-local, localities have become perhaps even more important in providing other resources that shape the nature of dependence. It is in localities, for example, that social capital is said to be generated (Putnam, 1993). Furthermore, the process of state devolution has shifted the burden to localities as the site where human capital should be developed and social support provided (Staeheli, Kodras, and Flint, 1997).

As I have argued, the implications of these shifts are not felt equally by all groups within localities; continuing the example of transnational migrants, the importance of the locality is probably greatest for those migrants with little capital—human or
monetary. Yet even this statement must be modified to recognize the influence of the processes at higher scales that impelled their migration and that might lead to migration to another place. In a sense, their dependence on the locality as a scale is great, but it is also possible that their dependence on a particular locality as a site is not.

As a space of engagement, the locality may be the only option for transnational migrants with few resources (Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Smith, 1998). Their access to political channels within national and international organizations (including state organizations) is limited. Reflecting these realities, urban social movements have been an important means of attaining the substantive rights of citizenship for transnational migrants. These movements focus on the provision of services, work rules, inclusion in public forums in which decisions are made, and issues of social justice generally (Pardo, 1990; Pinceti, 1994; Pulido, 1994). This is not to imply that these movements do not meet resistance and set-backs. Laws limiting services and political rights to immigrants have been passed in many localities, and xenophobia is common (O’Loughlin and Friedrichs, 1996). But the success of mobilizations is not as important to my argument about citizenship as the fact of mobilizations. To some degree, success would be difficult to measure, as a movement that achieves real victories in terms of expanding substantive aspects of citizenship for immigrants would almost certainly impose a burden on immigrants that they might be ill-equipped to afford. The time burdens associated with struggles to expand substantive rights and social welfare support and then to maintain those rights could constitute the imposition of a triple-shift, similar to that which Moser (1989) identifies for poor women in developing countries. But the presence of these movements in cities around the world speaks to the importance of localities as spaces of engagement in which efforts are made to achieve the substantive rights of citizenship for transnational migrants.

CONCLUSIONS

The argument presented in this paper is that globalization has been important in reconstructing citizenship. This reconstruction has not been in the form of a ‘global citizenship’ or probably even in a ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’; those may be goals of some scholars and activists, but they remain illusive as political realities. Rather, citizenship is differentiated in at least three ways: between scales, between formal and substantive aspects, and between different types of political subjects.

Formal aspects of citizenship remain rooted in the nation-state. For all the discussion of worlds without borders and the hollowing of the nation-state that has accompanied the strong globalization hypothesis, the nation-state remains the location in which the formal aspects of citizenship are structured. I have argued, however, that nation-states have largely ceded responsibility for the substantive aspects of citizenship to the international and local scales. Thus questions about the scales at which dependence and engagement are structured assume paramount importance in the spatiality of citizenship.
Access to all scales is differentiated, with profound implications for the ability of groups to be able to engage the issues and conditions that shape citizenship. The burden imposed by engagement—by trying to change conditions—is differentiated, as well. So while it may be most important for marginalized groups to attempt to change the conditions that create their marginalization, the costs may be too great for many. The inability to participate as active citizens may well serve to further erode citizenship rights, and probably most directly the substantive rights of citizenship (Lister, 1997).

In light of the above conditions, calls for a cosmopolitan and/or global citizenship should be re-evaluated in terms of what such a citizenship might likely achieve. It seems reasonable that the globalization of dependence, or the creation of spaces of dependence at the global scale that are increasingly important, should be addressed through the creation of a space of engagement; institutions that would create some sort of global citizenship seem critical in this regard (Lister, 1997). But if the argument presented here holds, then it is also necessary to create spaces of engagement through which the issues that affect the substantive rights of citizenship can be addressed. Lacking those sorts of spaces for direct engagements, networks that build links across scales are required. These sorts of networks have the potential to allow a multi-layered citizenship through which needs can be addressed. This is the further project of a reconfigured politics of scale through which the spatiality of citizenship is constructed.

REFERENCES


