It is well written, clearly presented and thought-provoking. To those interested in urban development it may offer a further insight into the mechanisms and processes underlying current conditions of planning and urbanization. It has taught me a great deal.

Michael Sofer
Bar-Ilan University


Pamela Shurmer-Smith is Principal Lecturer in Social Anthropology and Cultural Geography at the University of Portsmouth. Her book appears to have two aims. The first, in her own words, is to “address the state of India at the turn of the millennium.” The second, partly conveyed by the title, is to put the blame for the worsening condition of India’s poor since 1991 to the shift to a market-oriented economy and globalization. She succeeds, beyond reasonable expectations, in meeting the first aim; in the second, she doesn’t quite succeed.

The structure of the book is as follows. There is a 17-page Introduction, aimed largely at “a readership of interested outsiders, people who do not have much firsthand knowledge of India…” It provides thumbnail sketches of caste, religion, political structure, languages and the economy which would be useful for ‘insiders’ as well (even if they do not always agree with the author). The body of the book is divided into twelve chapters: 1) The New Economic Policy; 2) Affluent urbanites; 3) The middle mass; 4) The urban poor and marginalized people; 5) Rural life; 6) Women and men, old and young; 7) Violence, crime and corruption; 8) Divisions in society; 9) The Center and regional movements; 10) What price the environment?; 11) A steel frame?; and 12) India and her diaspora. These chapters occupy a little over 160 pages.

Taken together, Chapters 2–9, 11 and 12 provide a fair picture of the fissures and fault-lines of contemporary Indian society. Doing it in less than 150 pages is an achievement; on the other hand, in a longer book, the reader could well have lost sight of the wood for the trees. The author seems to have found just the right balance.

In style, the book is more journalistic than scholarly—that, in fact, is the compromise that has made the book possible. For the present reviewer, it is not journalistic enough. The use of jargon subtracts more than it adds. The text is full of quotations and names—the bibliography contains more than 500 entries. However, would ‘a readership of interested outsiders’ recognize more than half-a-dozen of these names, or be able to assign due weight to their statements? The book would have been more readable if these references had been banished to footnotes. A more scholarly work on the subject would have filled several large volumes, and been years in preparation. One of the merits of Shurmer-Smith’s book is that it has appeared in real time. One of the significant observations in it is that it is the precari-
ous condition of the lower middle class that feeds the growth of right-wing Hindu extremism (Chapter 3), and it is significant precisely because it is being made now. Society would be ill-served if such observations were held back by the demands of 'scholarship'.

What the book lacks is a chapter on population growth. This is consistent with the author's aim of addressing the state of India at the turn of the millennium, but is a serious drawback if one tries to link, causally, events set in motion (in India) in 1991 with the state observed in 2000. For, in this period, the population of India has increased by more than 20 percent, and the effects of this increase have to be factored out before one can identify effects attributable to the passage towards a market-oriented economy or globalization. Most of the author's qualitative conclusions would probably survive the assault of such an analysis, but the fact that it has not been done supplies ammunition to those who believe that the wealth-creating effects of technological change or economic integration outweigh their ills. They generally dismiss those who hold contrary views—and who protested in Seattle and Prague—as today's Luddites.

However, the war between the promoters and opponents of globalization is unnecessary, and unfortunate. The basic claims of both camps are valid, and do not contradict each other. They do not contradict each other because they refer to different time scales.

In the past, innovation and trade have produced dramatic increases in prosperity, but the time required for this increase to filter down to the poorest quintile has probably been longer than the length of the average working life. For example, per capita real GDP of Britain increased, on the average, by about 1.4 percent per year from 1900 to 1993 (The Economist (Pocket Britain in Figures) 1995). At this rate of growth, the doubling time is 50 years (doubling time in years equals 69 divided by the annual growth rate in percents). The duration of the average working life has been 40 years or less in the 20th century. The entire workforce of Britain would have been replaced ten years before real per capita GDP doubled, and probably before the lowest quintile began to share in the increasing prosperity. (Between 1979 and 1991, in Margaret Thatcher's Britain, net incomes of the lowest quintile dropped by 11 percent; after allowing for increased housing costs, the drop was 24 percent. The picture would not have been very different if the average growth rate of real per capita GDP had been 2 percent.

The adverse effects of 'creative destruction', to use Schumpeter's memorable phrase, manifest themselves much more rapidly, chiefly as destruction of workplaces (we are disregarding indirect effects mediated by the environment). Job losses also occur as a result of processes which most people would regard as wholly laudable. For example, virtually the entire textile industry of Israel—except the workers—migrated to Jordan, Egypt and Turkey in search of cheaper labor after the Oslo accords. Few of the protesters in Seattle and Prague would have objected to the Oslo accords.
The effects of globalization upon the poor would probably be best revealed by following the fortunes of the poor themselves over a relevant period of time. In a country like India, the poor would be the last two quintiles of the population. A relevant period of time—not just in India—would be between five and ten years. Transient effects may muddy the picture in periods much shorter than five years, and the real effects one wants to pinpoint will begin to be obliterated after about ten years, as people die or simply drop out of the workforce. Shurmer-Smith has not made such a study, but she has got the time scale right.

Rathin S. Sen
Cambridge University


Richard Isralowitz, Jonathan Friedlander and photographer Ron Kelley bring together text and images in a popular social science book that offers the reader an unusual way to become familiar with the main issue that characterizes Israel’s Negev Desert today. This ‘photo-documentation’ is not the common scholarly publication replete with recent social and spatial theories, although it is also not a common tourist souvenir, trying to glorify the image, the history and the future of the region.

The editors, both of whom have extensive experience working with and writing on marginal immigrant and indigenous groups in modern and post-modern societies, give the reader an opportunity to watch three very different groups that live together in the same peripheral region: Russian Jews, Ethiopian Jews, and Bedouin Muslims. Each of these groups represents the ‘transition’ of the Negev desert during the 1990s, yet they encountered a radical transition by themselves.

The Russian Jews are the most recent wave of immigration to arrive in Israel. For most of the 350,000 immigrants who arrived between 1989–1991, the transition meant moving from a metropolitan area to a low density region, from a Communist regime to a capitalist one, and from eastern Europe to the Middle East. At the same period, 40,000 Ethiopian Jews arrived in Israel. They experienced a radical change in all spheres, moving from rural to urban life, from being a black African majority to becoming a black minority and from a ‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ social environment. In contrast, the Negev Bedouin underwent their transition without moving from the region they have lived in for generations. For them the transition in the title refers to the move from a semi-nomadic to sedentary life within seven urban localities and numerous spontaneous settlements, and to a reality of being Muslim citizens in a Jewish state.

The transition that these groups are experiencing is examined in the book via the concept of settlement. One should notice that settlement in Israel, as in other settler