Sedentary states in Africa, Asia and the Middle East have often viewed nomadic pastoralists as lawless, shiftless communities difficult to administer, tax, and control. In turn, pastoral societies, organized as mobile, autonomous tribal groupings, have viewed sedentary state governments as foreign, oppressive, and exploitative. These attitudes are not new. Antagonistic relations between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary states were reported as early as the fifth century BC by Herodotus who wrote of threats to sedentary communities in Persia and Greece by 'robber' nomads; the Great Wall of China was built beginning in the third century BC to protect a newly unified China from horse riding nomads; and the 14th century AD explorer and chronicler Ibn Khaldun describes tensions between the ‘desert and the sown’, where nomads typically lay waste to sedentary ‘civilizations’ (Khanzhanov, 1994). Yet relations between nomads and the state have not solely been those of opposition and conflict, and the two have often co-existed in symbiotic and advantageous unions. Barth (1969) describes relations of nomadic pastoralists with agriculturalists and town people, where the ethnic boundaries between these groups are fluid and permeable and where relations with state structures vary over time and space. Indeed, examples such as the East African Maasai show long term economic relations between pastoralists and farmers (Spear and Waller, 1993).

The terms 'pastoralist' and 'state' are not monolithic, and there are many variations and exceptions to single terms. Nevertheless, certain generalizations can be made. Pastoralism refers to a particular form of economic production, that of human communities whose livelihood depends on the raising of domestic animals for subsistence and trade. Pastoral populations are typically small, mobile, and live in lands
too arid (warm or cold) for all but marginal agriculture. Unlike settled ranchers who raise domestic animals (particularly cattle and sheep) on private lands producing solely for the commercial market, pastoralists typically herd their animals to pasture, water, and markets, either in long-distance routes or smaller areas where they practice seasonal transhumance. The type of livestock raised varies geographically by the particular resources and adaptations of domestic animals to specific ecological zones. These include cattle herding groups of West and East African grasslands (e.g. Fulani, Nuer, Maasai); desert camel herders in North Africa, Arabia, South and Central Asia (Tuareg, Somalis, Bedouin, Raikas, Mongols), goat and sheep herd­ers of the Middle East (Basseri, Bedouin, Qashq’ai, Baluch), horse nomads of the Central Asian steppe (Mongols, Kazakhs), yak herders in the Himalayas (Tibetans), and reindeer pastoralists of northern Siberia and the Arctic Circle (Lapps or Saami, Tungus, Chukchi) (for comprehensive overviews of pastoralism see Barfield, 1993; Galaty and Johnson, 1990; Khazanov, 1994).

Pastoralists are typically organized into tribal groupings, where tribe is defined as a territorial group in which kinship is the principal organizer of society and production, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct in customs, dialect, and origins (Service, 1962). Politically, pastoral societies range from acephalous and autonomous societies organized by segmentary descent principles, such as Nuer and Maasai of East Africa, to highly stratified chieftaincies such as the Basseri and Qashq’ai of Iran, although even these chieftaincies are organized into tribal units (Beck, 1986; Barth, 1962). Salzman (2004) argues that pastoralist chieftaincies were formed in response to state structures, where local chiefs act as intermediaries with state representatives. Emanuel Marx (1977) has argued that tribes themselves are political constructions formed in response to dealing with larger polities. While chieftaincies lie midway between tribes and states, they may themselves be organized for conquest and incorporation of surrounding groups, at which point they may develop into states (Johnson and Earle, 2000).

The concept of 'state', like that of tribe, also holds a variety of meanings ranging from rational administration of society through organized government (Weber, 1946) to conflict theory which views states as monolithic entities that exercise a monopoly of power in a given territory (Johnson and Earle, 2000). Karl Marx (1848) described the state as an instrument of class control, where military, police, tax collectors and courts are established to ensure resources flow to, and power is maintained by, the ruling class. But as Khoury and Kostiner (1990) point out, current scholarship tends to view the state as a complex and fluid entity, ranging from highly centralized structures controlling all aspects of life, as in the former Soviet Union, to institutions of diffuse power negotiated though various constituencies, as in western parliamentary democracies. To varying degrees, all states aim at legitimacy and judicial sovereignty in a demarcated territory, but the degree they can control society (or societies) varies widely across the globe.

Khazanov argues that rarely if ever do nomadic societies become states them-
selves, although some nomadic societies are stratified with a high degree of social differentia
tion in both private ownership of livestock and the emergence of cen­
tralized roles of leadership (Khazanov, 1994). A notable example is that of Jenghiz Khan and his son Ögedey’s leadership of the Mongols in the 12th century, where an empire was created with an aristocracy and territorially administrated government. More usually, however, we find nomadic pastoralists subjugated by sedentary states, particularly in the last few centuries of nation-state formation in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. Lois Beck (1986) describes the situation of the Qashq’ai of southwestern Iran, whose confederacy in the 19th and 20th centuries enjoyed a high degree of political autonomy, establishing seasonal territories and controlling rights of migration passage through their territory. Throughout the 20th century, they had resisted state incursion and rule, including that of Reza Shah (1925-1941) and his son Mohammed Reza Shah in the 1950s and 1960s. “States came and went for these people, (but) tribes remained a constant” (Beck, 1991, 9). However by the 1970s, the Qashq’ai faced increasing pressure on land and resources from markets, peasants, and the expanding power of the state through roads, taxes, military conscription, leading to a cessation of nomadism and the rapid settlement of former nomads.

In the modern era of nation building and global economic integration, nomadic pastoralism has been seen as an obstacle to social and economic development, ‘primitive and wasteful’ that leads to environmental degradation and impedes market development (Fratkin, 1997). Emerging nations in Africa and the Middle East often hold the view that they cannot achieve nationhood on stable and permanent basis until non-sedentary tribal units become fully integrated with the rest of the nation. As Chatty (1990) has argued, the most commonly suggested solution to overcoming the obstruction and resistance of nomadic populations is the settling of tribes, and converting them to townspeople or agriculturalists. Chatty (1986) describes government policies towards Bedouin in Saudi Arabia, beginning in 1910 when King Abdul Aziz attempted to force the nomads into settlements. By the 1950s central rule in Arabia was weak and Bedouin returned to pastures, but this reversed in the 1960s and 1970s with large scale sedentarization and urban migration by Bedouin. The building of roads in the 1950s, Chatty argues, led to a decline in camels’ importance, a shift to sheep production, and trucking of livestock to pasture and milk to markets.

What explains this general opposition of nomads and the state? A major factor is certainly pastoral mobility, their need to move livestock over wide areas, which is often accompanied by the need, and inability, of the state to control their movements. As Meir (1988) argued, the centripetal (centralizing) nature of the state mitigates against the centrifugal (dispersed) nature of pastoral society, where household units are politically autonomous and physically mobile. In the past, states such as in Iran needed to control the movements of trade goods across pastoral lands. More recently they have sought to tax and recruit nomadic communities, and to control the economic resources of pastoral areas, whether for private farms and ranches as in
Still, there exists a wide variety in both internal organization and particular relations of pastoralists with larger state entities. In the Middle East and South Asia pastoralists have long had social and economic relations with sedentary farmers and townspeople, where these relations were often symbiotic, and negotiated by leaders from the pastoral communities (Gellner, 1990). Other areas such as East Africa before the 20th century, were characterized by low population densities in both pastoral grasslands and agricultural highlands, where there was neither the need nor the opportunity to incorporate grazing territories or migration routes, nor the need for political centralization or integration wider than their segmentary lineage systems. Nearly all of the East African pastoralists (with the exception of Tutsi and Ankole kingdoms) were acephalous with autonomous households, aligning by segmentary descent mainly to engage in warfare, usually with other pastoralists. Rather than administer through state governments, these pastoralists utilized stock partnerships and age-grade organization to maintain social ties wider than their patrilineal kinship organization, as exemplified by Turkana, Samburu, and Maasai societies (Galaty, 1993; McCabe, 2004; Spencer, 1965).

Finally, it is difficult to understand the impact of state policies on nomadic pastoral societies without also considering the wider processes of the 20th century, particularly large scale sedentarization and adoption of agriculture, urban migration and increased participation in the wage economy, the increased commoditization of the pastoral livestock economy, and the impact of globalization processes. All these factors have intensified tremendously in the 20th century as population growth, political incorporation, and state controls increased. But pastoralism has shown a tenacious resiliency, owing in no small part to economic advantages gained by raising livestock in arid lands. Although pastoralists are settling, this process is neither unidirectional nor absolute. Herders settle while farmers raise livestock, sometimes they conflict and sometimes they benefit each other. Sedentism in general is a large process associated with commoditization, education, and physical security (Fratkin, 1997; Fratkin and Roth, 2005; Meir, 1997; 2005).

THE ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME

The articles presented in this special issue of *Geography Research Forum* present a variety of perspectives on contemporary relations between pastoralists and state structures in India, Israel, Mongolia, Cameroon, Kenya, and Somalia. The authors come from a variety of academic disciplines including anthropology, geography, political science, and development studies, but each raises issues of geographic significance.

These case examples range across a continuum of pastoral-state relationships into several distinct types. The first set of articles illustrates the situation of marginalized
pastoralists dealing with dominant state structures, illustrated by the articles from India and Israel. The second set illustrates complex cases of weakened states with independent pastoral activity, including Somalia and Mongolia. A third set describes weak states dealing with marginalized pastoral groups, those in Cameroon, Kenya and Somalia.

Social transformations have occurred in the various productive landscapes of these countries—pastoral, agricultural, and urban spaces alike. But social change occurring in the pastoral regions may be the most profound. Pastoralists today are facing tremendous pressures on their former way of life. During the past 50 years, sedentarization has occurred in nearly all pastoral regions, associated with an increased commoditization of the livestock economy, loss of pasture lands and transformations to agropastoralism, agriculture, or town life. Formerly nomadic populations find themselves drawn to sedentary communities for a variety of reasons—further integration into the cash economy, access to formal education, and physical security. It is difficult to separate out formal policies of the state with co-existing features of urban migration and wage labor, the expansion of agriculture (both of farmers onto pastoral lands), and the increasing switch to farming by formerly nomadic pastoralists. What these articles show, however, is the large variety in situations and response posed by pastoralists in their relations with various state structures.

In the first article, Caroline Dyer examines education policies of the Government of India in regard to the Rabaris of Kutch. These policies, while aimed at “achieving education for all” (p. 14), in fact directly threaten the legitimacy and relevance of the nomadic way of life. This is quite a typical case of the role of education in pastoral life. On the one hand pastoral children are severed from their traditional life through formal schooling provided by the state, thus depriving the group from its ability to exploit resources that others cannot. On the other hand the state does not provide appropriate and sufficient education in return, thus a significant intellectual and entrepreneurship resource of the former pastoralists is threatened.

The reality of pastoralists in Gujarat, one of India’s most industrialized states, is that of shrinking pastures and little care or attention by the state. Many of those who put barriers in their way are of low caste status but with higher social standing due to education. For Dyer, the transhumant Rabaris see their social and occupation status declining and their way of life under pressure. While they want occupation and diversification of education, formal schooling in fact alienates Rabaris and weakens the authority of their traditional councils whose traditional knowledge has become obsolete and irrelevant. As government institutions demand that court functions be documented in writing, council leadership has shifted to settled educated leaders who are no longer pastoralists, and whose agenda for progress is at odds with traditional pastoral life. In emphasizing the crisis of the traditional leadership Dyer quotes a young educated leader: “If you want to improve the community the first step is to stop them from herding sheep and goats” (p. 20). Dyer writes of the fundamental cost of sedentism, modernizing, and formal education, which
means for the pastoralists giving up their animals, their way of life and security, and their traditional leadership and institutions. Prospects for social crisis under such circumstances are not negligible.

Purnendu Kavoori’s description of Raika pastoralists of Rajasthan points to intransigent policies of the state towards pastoralists in regard to economic development. He writes: “The fundamental crisis of pastoralism today is not that of rationality (of production), but one of legitimacy” (p. 39). Adopting a historical rather than a conceptual perspective on the relationship between the state and pastoralists, Kavoori attempts to show that the loss of legitimacy is not a matter of eternal and a-historical incompatibility but represents rather a particular conjuncture in an evolutionary relationship. Tracing government policies through both the colonial and post-colonial eras, Kavoori shows that pastoralists occupied a very insignificant subject of development in India. Although pastoralism remains viable and vital in the arid regions of Rajasthan, sedentism was the main objective of both the colonial rule and the post colonial development lexicon.

Today the Rajasthan government’s view is that of ‘uplifting poor pastoralists’, which is reflected in agricultural development officers’ views that pastoralism is inefficient and redundant, particularly when compared to commercial ranching techniques. Agricultural development agencies, financed by international and global institutions, encouraged the introduction of exotic breeds of sheep and new marketing structures for sheep products, holding that pastoralist production was irrational and ignorant of modern technology. Where these agents ignored the local and highly adapted breeds of sheep, Kavoori argues that hybridization projects were ultimately aimed at sedentarizing the nomads, as markets only favored those who were settled. This epistemological tension between modern and traditional knowledge and technology seems to answer the question he poses as to why, despite the best intentions, interventions among pastoralists rarely succeed.

Like the pastoralists of India, Bedouin in Israel also face discrimination, disempowerment, and marginalization. In their article on Bedouin and Israeli policies on land ownership and town planning, Emanuel Marx and Avinoam Meir describe how Middle Eastern states, including the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Israel all belittled and mistrusted Bedouin pastoralism. Israel incorporated both nomadic and sedentary Bedouin communities in the Negev following the 1948 war. The Israeli government set up special towns for Bedouins primarily because the government maintained that the land in their traditional territories is state land, but also, write the authors, because Jewish towns would not accept them. The Bedouin would not accept the first town established for them, complaining that the houses were too small and because they had to give up their rights to land. In the 1970s, Israel designated six more sites for Bedouin towns including Rahat, which now is the biggest and home to 39,000 people.

Living in kinship-based residential areas, Bedouin find little employment in Israel, and face difficulties in former lives as livestock herders. Today, Bedouin are involved
in civil struggle with the Israeli state, in part over the status of ‘unrecognized’ settlements outside towns, but also, as Marx and Meir write, over exclusion from the political process of planning. This has led to what the authors describe as ‘insurgent planning’ (p. 52), where Bedouin’s interpretation of historical and present reality is diametrically opposed to that of the state. Marx and Meir introduce a cultural social and spatial perspective on state-nomad relations, and conclude that the Israeli state never understood Bedouin concepts of land ownership, nor did it understand tribal organization. This political negotiation is ongoing.

The following four articles from Mongolia, Cameroon, Kenya and Somali describe situations reverse to Israel and India, that of weakened or absent states interacting with pastoral societies. Jörg Janzen’s article is an example of the persistence of pastoral culture and tradition vis-à-vis the strong grip of the state (in this case the socialist state) which enforced a far-reaching organizational change on pastoralists, and the economic, social, political and ecological consequences of the removal of this grip. He describes the break up of the socialist state in Mongolia in the 1990s and its effect on pastoral production. Throughout its history, Mongolia has been a society that depended on large numbers of livestock. Today the country continues to host one of the largest livestock production systems in the world—Mongolia encompasses 1.6 million km² of grassland, desert and forest but is populated by only 2.4 million people raising 26 million animals, including horses, goats, yaks, and camels. Before the 20th century, Mongols were organized into territorial units united, to varying degrees at different periods, into centralized confederations. Livestock production occurred under management of formal groupings called khotails which were based on kinship and residential ties. Under communist government rule between 1921-1991, Mongols were settled on rural collectives (negdel) and as urban laborers. Animals were trucked to pastures, and the nomadic lifestyle, as well as regulation of pasture by religious monasteries, was curtailed. When the socialist government collapsed, former production cooperatives were privatized and there was a large movement towards pastoral production of lucrative ‘cashmere’ wool for sale to Russia and China. Simultaneously, there was a withdrawal of state supports for pastoralism including roads, fuel, and regulation of pastures, leading to serious overgrazing and resource degradation.

Janzen writes that the collapse of the socialist government meant a sudden end to an export driven economy, and the reemergence of subsistence economy which only now is gradually being rebuilt around cashmere wool exports. Nevertheless, pastoral production doubled during the 1990s, as Ulaanbaatar’s population was reduced and the city emptied by more than half as people lost the former supports of the socialist cooperatives. In the course of the past decade, Mongolia has shifted from a nearly complete domination of the government in pastoral activities to a near total neglect of the rural infrastructure, leaving the pastoral populations highly vulnerable to natural disasters, such as the dzud heavy snowfall of 1999-2000 which wiped out large numbers of animals. Unregulated, the traditional kinship based
khot-ail units now move their animals across former territorial boundaries, leading the environmental degradation (overgrazing) and unregulated social conflict. Janzen recommends a reassertion of state interventions, including legal provisions for the ecological sustainability of pasture management, technical services, and support of business and cooperative marketing, including the manufacture of woolen goods in the face of enormous competition from China.

The lack of state interventions has long been noted in Africa, particularly those with high degree of ethnic conflict. The articles by Moritz on the Fulani of Cameroon and Galaty on Kenya suggest not an absence of state structure, but an interaction by pastoral populations with governments that are weak or lack legitimacy. Peter Little's article presents the story of pastoralists without a state, Somalia, and of pastoral Somalis creating their own post-civil war economy.

Mark Moritz challenges the image of the African state in the 'pastoralists' literature' as against its image in the political science literature. He argues that the nature of pastoral-state relations depends on the type of model of the state one chooses: the rational Weberian Western state versus the neo-patrimonial African state. Focusing on the latter, he suggests that the nature of relations is best understood by looking at how the state actually works on the ground. It transpires that this nature is not necessarily one of opposition or antagonism, but more of articulation and integration. This is particularly true in Cameroon and in the other Chad Basin states, where state rule is weak, and where the rule of law, which may appear on paper, is actualized on the ground through the informal politics of patrimony, patronage, and bribery. Therefore, rather than pose pastoral-state relations as 'centripetal/centrifugal' opposition, centering on ideologies and official development programs, Moritz describes how FulBe (Fulani) pastoralists of the Chad Basin seek informal politics, which focus on a 'follow the money' approach, in order to integrate more fully with the state and thus have access to grazing resources. This implies that there is a considerable gap between state policy and its actualization.

Moritz traces this history to pre-colonial areas, where FulBe often paid tribute and grazing fees to rulers such as the Bornu state, or had their own patrimonial state in the 1800s, where sedentary FulBe ruled through local officials. Under colonial rule, this patrimony continued with administrative officers acting as intermediaries between the colonial state and local communities. Under the post-colonial regime of Paul Biya, Fulani influence declined as the country was ruled by southerners. Today Fulani, like other rural populations, face police violence and government extortion. Rather than focus on formal structures of laws and politics and on public policies of the state, Moritz argues that in these states researchers' analysis should focus on the informal networks and interests of agents of both the state and the pastoral herders, to each other's benefit.

John Galaty's article is another example of how the African state challenges classical models of the state, in this case through ethnic diversity of the political landscape. Galaty focuses on politics in present day Kenya, which is marked by ethnic
violence, particularly in pastoralist regions. Galaty argues that these ethnic conflicts are framed and construed by the predicaments of the state, and that the cause of these conflicts is rooted in state policies, not abstract competition between pastoralists. Galaty describes the ethnic conflict involving Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu pastoral groups in the 1990s. He argues that conflict at the ethnic and community level is framed, constrained, and endangered by the contemporary African state. Conflicts between Maasai pastoralists and Kikuyu farmers in southern Kenya, and between Turkana and Samburu herders in the north, are not a result of scarcity, weakness or absence of state security, but are related to causes that lie within state policies which play with and manipulate ethnic interests. In southern Kenya in the 1980s, Maasai herders saw a great deal of land lost to farmers from Kikuyu and other ethnic groups; when President Moi ran in his first multiparty election in 1992, Maasai were encouraged to raid and terrorize Kikuyu farmers, in part to prevent a loss of the Presidents' supporters in Parliament. In the arid north of Kenya, conflict took the form of cattle raiding between competing pastoral Turkana, Pokot, Samburu, and Rendille, where Galaty argues that government forces (military and district officers) directly profit from the raids, and are unwilling to intervene until it served the government's purposes. Consequently the local pastoral groups regard the state as just another competitor for resources.

In the final article, Peter Little presents a remarkable picture of pastoralists in a stateless, anarchistic environment—that of present day Somalia since their civil war of the early 1990s. Where the pastoral sector made up 80 percent of Somalia's pre-turmoil exports, it only received six percent of the public expenditures under former state rule. Before the country's breakup in 1991, the major trade for cattle was within Somalia itself, in local and national markets. During this period, only one quarter of marketed cattle were taken across border to Kenya and five percent to the Middle East, mainly through urban traders in Kismayo and Mogadishu. All trade suffered during the civil war, except the cross border trade to Kenya which increased four fold between 1989 and 1998. This uninterrupted trade benefited from both the pastoralists' and the traders' mobility.

Apparently, what was damage and destruction for the settled farming population (e.g. the collapse of water projects) was an opportunity for the herders who enjoyed the spontaneous 'privatization' of water and pastures and whose family herds increased. Little writes: "In a comparative sense the capacity to be mobile, traverse long distances across harsh terrain, and avoid interactions with political authorities have always made mobile pastoralists, like the Somalis of the lower Jubba, threatening to sedentary populations and states", and thus "...herders who relied little on governmental services often survive better than other populations" (p. 140). Little is not arguing for the dissolution of the state as a direct benefit to pastoralists, as states are important to defend national boundaries, protect natural resources, protect livestock from diseases, and provide health care and education to the pastoral societies. But it is remarkable to see, once again, the resilience of pastoral populations when
SOME COMMON THEMES

These articles illustrate a large number of scenarios in state-pastoral relations in the world today, each showing a range of nuanced and complex relations between states of varying power and influence and their pastoral populations. Despite the limited number of articles some major and common themes may be identified. The first theme relates to the problem of legitimacy of pastoral life in the modernizing state. The three cases from India and Israel demonstrate how pastoralists often become victims of modern technology, modern education and commoditization and thus find themselves marginalized from the mainstream of life, often due directly to actions taken by the state. This is likely to be followed by a deep crisis of traditional leadership and the emergence of new elites who attempt to bridge the development gaps.

This socio-cultural issue is related to another theme, that of preserving ethnic identity in the face of these changes. It transpires that there is no clear-cut answer to the dilemma whether preserving the traditional ethnic identity of the pastoral group serves its interests, as this depends on the circumstances. Facing strong state authorities the Negev Bedouin benefited quite considerably from insisting on their identity. It is questionable whether this is true for those Rabaris who still insist on a pastoral mode of living vis-à-vis the settled Rabaris and other ethnic groups in India.

This leads to the next issue, that of resilience of pastoral populations. In part it is related to the issue of ethnicity. As the Mongolian and Somali cases show, when state impediments are removed, those who presently are or were pastoralists in the past find it highly beneficial to resume their pastoral life and to survive more successfully than those who were or are not. This is particularly true when also economic equilibria have collapsed. Preservation of ethnic identity may be found to be an asset here. Yet, pastoralists may demonstrate resilience even when faced with a strong government. This may lead to conflict and the formation of informal political organizations such as the group council among the Kutch Rabaris or the RCBUV of the Israeli Bedouin. In both cases these bodies are not recognized by the state, and the pastoralists seek formal recognition either in the form of recognized Bedouin settlements or the status of a Scheduled Rabari Tribe. In many respects the unrecognized Bedouin space means absence of state governance there. This bears some similarity to the case of Somali pastoralists (and perhaps also Mongolia) with quite similar methods of subsistence and survival, primarily through informality of many activities and practices, and with some similar consequences in terms of ecological deterioration.

Finally, the idea that pastoralists and the state represent a clear-cut opposition of powers who are constantly in conflict is challenged here in two forms. First, the cri-
sis of the pastoralists of Rajasthan is analyzed from the perspective that state-pastoralists relations must not necessarily be viewed as eternal and a-historical. Temporal and spatial circumstances may occur to generate a more fluid and flexible pattern of relations. Second, the centrifugal (pastoralists)-centripetal (state) model of relations may contain considerable flexibility than hitherto thought of. In particular one must consider the important role of informal politics of the elite and bureaucracy at all levels, especially the local level. This may generate a reality of relations that is a far cry from that expected given the official state ideology and national policies on the one hand and cultural tendencies of the pastoralists on the other hand. The latter form of relations may fit better the modern state model where the gap between state ideology and informal politics may be narrow.

These themes, particularly those related to resilience and persistence of pastoral culture, carry us back to Khazanov (2004) who has recently argued it is unlikely pastoralism as an economic activity will disappear in the near future, although pastoral peoples may find themselves more settled and less mobile. But the importance of livestock in national economies—for milk, meat, wool, and hides—and their particular adaptation to arid lands, will see continuing negotiation, struggle, and accommodation between states and their pastoral populations.

REFERENCES


