Public Assets vs. Public Interest: 
Fifty Years of High-rise Building in Tel Aviv-Jaffa

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In order to provide for public needs authorities collect capital assets and sustain fixed assets that house spatial facilities and infrastructure. However, as structural and urban regime scholars showed, this inherently compromises public interest, while authority’s enslavement to capital increases social strata and limits development to market lines. In addition, these problems increased substantially since the cutbacks in national provision to cities in the late 1970s, as the rise of entrepreneurial urban regimes and the activation of conservative Post-Keynesian policies took hold. Accordingly, the main compromising planning practices found in the new era are ad-hoc flexible planning regulations, luxurious building projects and large-scale privatization of fix public assets. Planning deals that pack these practices together are the data of this article, but they were found as continuous planning convention in a tracing of the high-rise building activity in Tel Aviv-Jaffa since the 1950s. The consistency of privatization acts is related to the mere existence of many publicly owned lots in the city, yet this affluence does not explain the long-time compromising usage of such assets. For explanation, the article dwells on the subject of continuity and evolution in practice through structural periods, by readdressing urban regime principals as portrayed by Clarence Stone and hegemonic accumulation strategy as defined by Bob Jessop.

Keywords: Public Interest, Urban Politics, Planning Deals, Periodization and Continuity, Local Conventions, Hegemony.

Long-term planning conventions that link urban growth with compromises to public interest are revealed when tracing the history of the wide spread peaks of Tel-Aviv’s skyline. The detailed research (Margalit, 2007) showed that from the 1950s on, high-rise planning was mainly associated with luxury markets, and essentially conducted through privatization deals. The process incorporated numerous local development plans that sacrificed public and environmental assets and were justified by the need of the public for capital. In the present article, I will present this method as an opaque practice, which gained magnitude as it was realized and adjusted to structural changes and sustained growing public awareness in the city.

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Soon after its appearance in urban life, the tall building type was described as "a machine that makes the land pay" (Willis, 1995, 19, quoting a phrase put in 1900 in New York by architect Cass Gilbert). Since then, high-rise building closely associates urban politics with planning initiatives and thus challenges local zoning and regulation in various ways across the globe (Tafury, 1990; Gossel and Leuthauser, 1991; Whitehand, 1987).

Understanding this, the evaluation of Tel-Aviv’s high-rise planning compromises will follow observations made by leading structural and urban regime scholars (Elkin, 1987; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Fainstein, 1991; Harvey, 1989; 1990; Stone, 1989; 1993) concerning planning regulation, public interest, capital, and governance. In concordance with the detailed research, I will further engage regime theory’s structural concepts and follow later scholarship (Jessop 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 1997; Macleod and Goodwin, 1999) with regard to continuity of compromising practices through historic and structural changes.

To do so, I will examine the local planning conventions as a product of the local development regime maintenance as defined by Clarence Stone, placing particular emphasis on the local regime composition of fixed and capital assets (Stone, 1989, 1993; Harding, 1994). I will propose that the local compromising practice, concurrent with Stone’s assertions on regime maintenance, was formerly and increasingly associated with financial success and feasibility of markets and assets. Furthermore, I will show that from the outset and throughout the entire period, high-rise building was an entrepreneurial product that mostly submitted to the local land regime, where 70% of municipal lands were publicly owned and managed by national and local authorities (Tel-Aviv municipality, 1954; Yodfat, 1969; Golan, 1999; Alterman, 1997).

Comprehensive state involvement in urban development economy is a condition common to cities in Israel since the years after the state’s declaration, when 93% of all land became publicly managed and administered by the Israel Land Authority (ILA) and owned by the state or by public bodies (Werczberger and Borukhov, 1999). In Cities that were built before 1948, such lands are mostly state’s allocated Arab-absentee lands in addition to previous colonial government’s lands and institutional holdings (Yiftachel and Kedar, 2000; Alterman, 1997; Golan, 2001; Kark, 1993). Authorities mostly remain formal title² (Alterman, 1997; Werczberger and Borukhov, 1999) and thus remain involved in development and redevelopment of various urban areas. In Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, most high-rise locations match the spread of such lots throughout the city. The planning deals obliterated absentee Arab and German villages and their agricultural lands, old slum areas created during colonial times, as well as old landmark buildings and designated public facilities, parks and gardens.

Several questions are raised when dealing with the implications of the Israeli land regime, but in the present article, I will focus on its role in the urban development coalition and postpone elaboration on related national and identity issues
to another article. However, since the local land-regime is a representation of national political decisions (Alterman, 1997, 2003; Golan, 2001; Kark, 1993; Kedar and Yiftachel, 2006, Yiftachel and Kedar, 2000; Yiftachel, 2006), I will rely upon Yiftachel’s (2009) association of urban politics with the state. Following Jessop’s *state theory* (1990, see also Jessop, 1997), I will examine the local magnitude and consistency of compromising planning practices as an outcome of hegemonic accumulation strategy experienced in the urban arena, and of the social legitimacy it entailed. In this way, the study will not only demonstrate regime theory principles concerning the social implications of coalition maintenance and asset composition, but also shed light on the social nature of planning conventions and compromises.

The main planning tool used in local economic strategy was the local plan, or spot-zoning scheme, which was implemented separately and in a wide variety of ways throughout the city and over a period of years. Thus, I will follow the evolution of Tel-Aviv’s skyline via a series of such plans through four building cycles that rose and fell since the 1950s in accordance with structural and political events. In this way, I will conclude by relating to spot-zoning critics (Alfasi and Portugali, 2004; Alfasi, 2006; Booth, 1996; Cullingworth, 1993). Like them, I will assess the weakness of this practice in serving the public interest. In addition, I will suggest considering this practice as a systemic function, due to its efficiency in budget and capital enhancement, and its strong attachment to privatization and to entrepreneurial ambitions of urban growth machines.

The article will first present the theoretical framework in urban theory, followed by a short historic background, and finally, focus on the planning practices over four buildings cycles. In conclusion, the article will examine the public interest position with regard to the above.

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

*Structure, Planning and the Public Interest*

David Harvey (1990) structurally aligned the correspondence between planning regulation, public interest and capital accumulation in two paths taken by governments (local and federal). The first path follows government’s role as regulator of capitalist relationships through market interference, legislation, planning and creation of social infrastructure. In the framework of Marxist theory, Harvey considers this path as unstable as the market itself, is strongly exposed to interior and exterior strains. Thus, the second path he draws is self evident due to the state’s constant need for capital in taxes and revenues, which forces it to gain self-justification in the public eye and sustain acceptance of its projects. Consequently, governments generate a sense of community beyond social strata, and anesthetize the public realm to match popular taste. Architecture and planning used in this path are commercial-
ized, and according to Harvey (1989) serve both the state and the accumulation of capital. Harvey claimed that the notion described as the second path has worsened in the current era, under the Post-Fordist/Post Keynesian structural mode and a conservative state and urban entrepreneurial regime (Harvey, 1989; 1990; Lauria, 1997). He regarded this regime type as currently ordinary in all cities (1989) and related its planning practices to capital accumulation in the highly competitive global market. With no leading social project, Harvey claimed (1990), welfare missions are replaced with urban spectacles such as mega gentrification projects, giant malls and/or luxurious high-rises (examples: the restructuring of Baltimore harbor as a giant mall and convention center or the ITT tower in NY). The public is less served, and at the same time less aware of the compromises to its interests, blinded by a contemporary version of the old roman "bread and games".

One issue this view raises relates to the explanatory power of its general periodization with regard to planning compromises that harms the public interests, since while Harvey assigns structural principles as the point of origin for all eras (Harvey, 1985; 1989; 1990) he mainly focuses his criticism on the changes of the current one. A similar duality is to be found in the local typologies put by urban regime theorists to explain urban political economy in USA, which connects structural generalities to periodical urban collaborations. The theory presented urban politics as based on the "division of labor between market and state" (Elkin, 1987, 18-35), "the formation of coalitions of key interest groups, as a critical factor of urban development" (Harding, 1994, 357), and the internal organization and external relations of public authorities (Lauria, 1997). Regime’s typology thus signifies a specific constellation of "the various land interests and politician’s alley, electoral coalition strategy and the structure of bureaucratic service provision" (Lauria, 1997, 3; Elkin, 1987). As explained by Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) since the above is in symbiosis with the characteristics of the economic and budget strains and with the social struggle, thus it is also timed with structural eras and turns.

Like Harvey, Fainstein and Fainstein (1983; Lauria, 1997) explained the general dominance of business in all urban coalition’s types, but focused on differences and change. They stated that such dominance of business is based on authority’s budgetary concerns, which lead them to constantly gain revenues by enhancing existing property investments and attracting new ones. In this context, they claimed, poor urban citizens are always considered a burden on the municipal budget. Thus, they portrayed urban development reality in its constant structural strains and at the same time described reduction in the stake of the public interest. The two regime types they defined between 1950 and 1975 are directive regime (until 1964) followed by concessionary regime, where both presented large and ever growing redevelopment and welfare projects directly sponsored by local governments. Following the end of the post WWII economic "boom" in 1973, a "conservative regime" rose, in which "capital striking back" (Lauria, 1997, 3) was formed in business-oriented coalitions,
and entrepreneurial deal making became the main path of urban development.

In this context, Susan Fainstein detected major changes in Western planning practice, as municipalities had to adjust to substantial reduction in federal funding (Fainstein, 1990). In particular, in her research of the New York and London planning activity in the 1980’s (Fainstein, 1991), she established that "Focus has switched from regulating to promoting development... Planners engage primarily in deal making and negotiation rather than land use designation" (ibid, 22).

In later years, the typology described above was criticized by European scholars who stated it does not fully match particular urban researches and suggested that the accordance between structural periodization, urban regime typology and practice is less direct (Lauria, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 1997; Macleod and Goodwin, 1999). Following this, the point of departure for the present article will be the similarities between the characters of and the compromises made in the two projects Fainstein signified as the greatest entrepreneurial deals of the 1980’s, and the ones found before and after this date, in Tel-Aviv’s high-rise projects.

**Entrepreneurial Planning and Privatization**

The two projects Fainstein (1991) signaled are the redevelopment of Battery Park in New York and of the Docklands in London. Like most of the high-rise projects made in Tel-Aviv, both projects were promoted by government and city authorities, and included major privatization of public-owned lands. Under a mandate to assist the working of the market, the planners worked out deals to obtain some community benefits in return for planning premises. The deals included major land revenues and property taxes, luxurious high building and flexible regulation: "In both cases the planning authority’s principal objective is the enticement of private sector investment, and physical design components of planning activity are focused on creating a desirable environment for prestigious corporations and luxury apartment dwellers" (Fainstein, 1991, 27).

Tel-Aviv is a much smaller city (400,000 citizens at its demographic peak, but center of a metro region of 3 million) than the ones Fainstein (1991) studied, much younger (was founded 100 years ago as a Jewish settlement at the outskirts of the Arab city Jaffa) and much less central or affluent on the global scale. Nevertheless, the comparison of deal making described above to Tel-Aviv is relevant as similar entrepreneurial practices were taking place on smaller scale projects, but on spread sites and zones and for a much longer period.

In this context the vital attachment of privatization of fix public assets, luxurious high buildings and flexible regulation will be evaluated in Tel-Aviv’s planning deals for its implication on public interest, following Fainstein’s examinations. First, I will refer to her claim that the public benefits gained in the projects were inferior to the commercial benefits given. Second, I will evaluate, in the local context, her assessment that since "public empowerment would limit the ability of the planner to maneuver among his or her various constituencies and might preclude any deal
being struck" (Fainstein, 1991, 25), the entrepreneurial practices narrowed democracy in planning. Third, I will follow her main critic that though entrepreneurial practices are realistic and effective methods for urban regeneration, they are heavily restricted by market- "Planners become trapped in the logic of the bottom line, trading off regulations governing density, light, and air" (Fainstein, 1991, 31). As a result- "planners seeking to benefit low income people...The most they can do is manipulate market forces to produce side-benefits" (ibid). The harsh meaning of this assessment is the narrow alley left for planning to serve public interest only as it fits market lines and the affluent sectors.

These observations will serve as a basis for the evaluation of the planning practices in Tel-Aviv high building deals. To focus the agglomerated characters of the local planning conventions on the public interest, I will now discuss the issue of continuity in urban regime politics.

**Urban Regime, Land Regime**

Like Fainstein, most urban regime scholars considered public interest in terms of social strata and democracy, as mutually affected by the formation of business oriented urban coalitions. As presented above, most coalitions' typologies presented growing amplification in the business orientation, but some scholars also related it to local practical continuation and geographic differentiation. In this way, the term "entrepreneurial regime" was coined by Elkin (1987) to describe phenomena similar to the current "conservative regime" of Fainstein and Fainstein (1983; Lauria, 1997). However, he related it to South Western cities in the US during the entire era since WWII. In this way, Elkin's work on Dallas's long term entrepreneurial regime (Elkin, 1987) showed clear continuity in compromising the general public interest, although "more voices are now (in the 1980's) being heard in the city... they had not made extensive links between public officials and business leaders very difficult to maintain" (Elkin, 1987, 49).

Clarence Stone bunched such social implications as outcomes of regime inner relationships, stating that urban regime (or coalition) sustainability over time greatly depends on its affectivity in "getting things done" (Stone, 1989; 1993). Given that "the effectiveness of local government depends greatly on the cooperation of nongovernmental actors and on the combination of state capacity with nongovernmental resources" (Stone, 1993, 6), he stated that "The interactions people engage in and the relationships they form (negotiations and coalition building, for example) shape preferences, including understanding about what is feasible and what is not. In this process, those with more resources (especially resources that can build additional support or advance a policy purpose), have a superior opportunity to rally support to the cause they favor" (Stone, 1993, 11).

Hence, he stated, "democratic concepts as one person-one vote and equality before the law are significant, but the unequal distribution of economic, organizational, and cultural resources has a substantial bearing on the character of actual
governing coalitions” (Stone, 1993, 9). In such conditions, "material resources are especially useful (Stone, 1993, 11), while "Lost causes or hopeless causes command few supporters" (Stone, 1993, 11). Complex targets constantly fail to attract supporters and deprived areas or communities are continuously exposed to neglect or low investments (Stone, 1993, 2005; see also Pierre, 1999). The main object and target of "success" is economic, while "Votes count but resources decide" (Stone, 1993, 8, after Rokkan, 1966, 105).

Stone’s focus is on the inner composition of the urban coalitions as connected to the actual local material resources: "public policies are shaped by three factors: (1) the composition of a community's governing coalition, (2) the nature of the relationships among members of the governing coalition, and (3) the resources that the members bring to the governing coalition" (Stone, 1993, 2). Thus, he pointed to the continual practice, in which "restructuring will reflect the concerns of the governing coalition and its capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of its actions" (Stone, 1993, 15), in other words, its ways to self sustain through major changes. In addition, he advocated local variants, stating that "Restructuring does not itself dictate that a city like New Haven must concentrate on the physical reconstruction of its central business district and displace one-fifth of its population without adequate attention to relocation facilities. Nor does it dictate that a city like Baltimore must concentrate for years on converting its harbor area to convention and tourism uses while neglecting its school system… Regime theory… asks how and why some concerns gain attention and others do not (Stone, 1993, 15-16).

In the last instance Stone projected a different light on one of Harvey’s prominent examples for the new entrepreneurial era—Baltimore Harbor (Harvey, 1990), while stating that "hegemony in a capitalist order may be more a matter of ease of cooperation around profit-oriented activities than the unchallenged ascendancy of core ideas” (Stone, 1993, 12). Thus, he presented an evolutionary view of unequal urban politics, based on feasibility and continuity of resource holding and economic success. In his view coalitions do form and change with time, their fluid preferences "refer to the potential for change", while establishing a pattern of interaction and resources that "has substantial staying power" (Stone, 1993,14). In such conditions, what he describes is actually regime evolvement, which does not necessarily means regime replacement.

Following the above, and although Stone’s thesis (like most Urban Regime theorists) related to a liberal political economy which was "guided mainly, but not exclusively, by privately controlled investment decisions” (Stone, 1993,2), his principals actually offer a strong tool for research of continual practice and of urban arena’s with distinctly different compositions of resources, such as the ones found in Tel-Aviv’s. In this way, the present article will evaluate the continuous local planning activity in relation to feasibility of development and financial success over time, given the dominance of institutional land—assets in the local development coalitions. First, it will correlate the mutual evolution of the local "state’s capacity and
nongovernmental resources” with the type of high-rise deals made in successive periods since 1953. Second, it will measure the feasibility and financial success of the planning deals and analyze them as objects of regime maintenance made by ”getting things done” (Stone, 1987; 1989; 1993). Third, it will evaluate the fluid and the fixed targets of the activity by looking at the nature of compromises to public interest that were taken in the successive high-rise deals throughout the city and over time.

**Urban Politics, State and Hegemony**

The evaluation of the development activity in Tel-Aviv as described above cannot ignore the Israeli national economic strategy and planning laws when considering the local realm of a national (almost) monopolistic land regime, and the fact that the planning system in Israel is central and even centralistic (Alterman, 1997; Alfasi, 2006). However, these issues were hardly dealt by Stone, apart from stating that the cooperation between state and private resources is not limited to the urban realm: ”even at the national level in a so-called ‘strong state’ country” (Stone, 1993, 7). In later studies, urban governing regimes ”themselves, become entrenched in critical political economy as practically adequate explanation of economic development and governance” (Macleod and Goodwin, 1999, 707, the quote also relates to regulatory modes and institutional thicknesses and refers to Painter, 1995; Jessop, 1995; Peck, 1995; Valler et al, 1998). Alternatively, this article’s research method will align itself with scholars that view urban politics as a practice that constantly interacts with regional, national and global politics (Goodwin and Painter, 1997; Macleod and Goodwin, 1999; see also Sellers, 1995; Brenner, 2007; Sideway, 2007; Peck and Tickle, 1995; Yiftachel, 2009). In regarding Israeli national development, I will rely on Yiftachel’s addressing of urban regimes ”to the general social science concept of ‘regime’ which denotes an institutionalized logic of power” (Yiftachel, 2009, 94).

Thus, I will seek explanation by correlating Stone’s ”feasible hegemony” with hegemonic economic strategies as defined by Bob Jessop in his *State theory* (Jessop, 1990) and his consideration of urban regime sustainability as closely connected to the form of the local hegemonic block and the historic block (Jessop, 1997). In ‘state theory’ Jessop defined accumulation strategy as ”a specific economic ’growth model’ compatible with its various extra-economic preconditions and also outlines a general strategy appropriate to its realization” (Jessop, 1990, 198). Thus, he listed two main strategies and elaborated on their implications on society. The first strategy was termed *economic domination* that can be pursued by state power or a dominant fraction of capital imposing ”its own particular ’economic-corporate’ interest on the other fractions regardless of their wishes and/or their expense” (Jessop, 1990, 199). The second strategy is a long lasting *economic hegemony* that ”derives from economic leadership won through general acceptance of an accumulation strategy. Such a strategy must advance the immediate interests of other fractions by integrating the circuit of capital in which they are implicated at the same time as it secures the long
term interests of the hegemonic fractions” (Jessop, 1990, 199).

Hence, Jessop relied on the concept of urban governance in examining "how expectations are stabilized within particular structural context and behavior is regulated through conventions, compromise, and the exercise of power" (Jessop, 1997, 59). However, he went beyond Stone’s definitions of unequal urban distribution, in addressing long-standing compromises to public interests. Stone stated that “Those with fewer resources to contribute” are confined to ‘small opportunities’, particular projects and individual benefits that are essentially byproducts of the main policy thrust” (Stone, 1993, 11; 1989). Jessop explained such minor compensations as practice that serves in maintaining social acceptance to a compromising hegemonic economic strategy that mainly serves the long-term interest of the elite.

Accumulated Compromises

As portrayed above, urban politics was viewed by Jessop within a chronology that is uneven to all components of the economy and thus cannot be fully periodicized (Jessop, 1990, 1997). In describing such chronology, Goodwin and Painter (1997) stated that urban regimes should be viewed as part of a complex, diverged and relatively stable social chronology. Within such a process, bigger conflicts signal crises and new eras, however, it is not reasonable that new modes of regulation (like Post-Fordism) appear as clear-cut occurrences that replace all the previous practices at once. Hence, they claimed, only by concrete context-related research can one relate between geographic conditions and global modes and thus examine continuity and change.

Following this and the previous chapters, the present article will present the concrete findings of Tel-Aviv’s high-rise projects as a planning chronology that shows a complex and evolutionary ‘rhythm’ of changes. A slow continuous beat represented the local physicality, property laws and socio-economic urban areas. A moderate tempo represented regime’s terms of maintenance, elite long-term interests and the state’s long standing economic strategy and its social legitimating. In a faster mode, planning reactions were taken by the local and national regime in order to balance themselves while adjusting to changing historic terms. Following Stone, this practice meant that the local regime’s planning ambitions, inspirations and targets addressed previous “getting things done” methods to new feasibilities, market conditions and social legitimating. I will show here that the flip side of this routine meant that the nature and magnitude of the early compromising practices lead its evolution in the later periods. In terms of the socio-physical environment of the city, compromises to public interests were accumulated, both in practice and in presence.

Thus, the next chapters will measure the continuity and change in the accumulated compromising routines, through successive known historic periods. The first chapter will briefly follow the planning and evolution of the city of Tel-Aviv in the fifty years preceding its first high-rise buildings, to establish the main practices taken and the urban physical and political scenario. The next chapters will trace the high-
rise buildings as planned and constructed in four periods, elaborate on the external and internal conditions and focus the deal making and realization.

Periodical division was not taken for granted but as a base for evaluation and reference between the planning activity and the historic constellation. The chapters will present four high-rise-building cycles, which were largely responsive to both the local national historic scenario and the global structural terms. Hence, the development activity evidenced in the building cycles show some accordance to the characters of urban regime typology as defined by Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) and others. The first high-rise building cycle took place from the establishment of the state until the six-day war (1967), a period of large governmental development activity that resembles the one typified as ‘directive regime’ in US cities (Fainstein, 1983). The second wave arose high after the war, fell following the oil crisis and the October war (1973) and further declined to its lowest point with the fall of the socialistic government in 1977. In this period, large welfare investments were taken by the local and national ‘concessionary regime’, in addition to growing investment in the local growth economy. The third era presented a bigger mixture of trends, change and reorganization alongside the national and global changes of the 1980’s. Evidences of a new planning practice and ‘conservative regime’ were found, but the rising of local “capital striking back” (Lauria, 1997, 3) and a business-oriented coalition activity were apparent later, in the fourth cycle occurred in the late 1980’s by the end of the first Intifada.

This cycle began with large governmental initiatives in order to meet the large influx of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, while entrepreneurial deal making increased further with globalization and the Oslo accords. The fall in development activity came with the burst of the local hi tech bubble and finalized with the coming of the second Intifada in 2001, and rose back with higher luxurious towers a few years later.

In the next chapters, I will demonstrate the clear change in the height, luxurious design and the amount of the tall buildings, which marked the urban regime of the last decades as highly entrepreneurial. I will also show that the high building activity was entrepreneurial throughout the entire period, and how the new deals as well as their compromises to public interest have a lot in common with their predicators.

The references for the following elaboration are numerous: zoning amendments and planning schemes, maps, aerial and historic photos, statistics and other official publications by the state and the municipality, and property certifications. Based on this, the detailed research recognized the connection between the local land- regime and the high-rise buildings, as well as the variety of building rules made individually. Thus, I will conclude by evaluating the consistency and evolution of compromises to public interest, using the social and theoretical terms elaborated above and assess them in the local realm.
“Fashionable direction” that extends from a city’s older and poorer areas to its affluent new neighborhoods is evident in most cities (Barnett, 1986). In Tel-Aviv such an arrow was stretched to the north practically from the beginning of the Jewish settlement in the northern outskirts of Jaffa. Since 1909 and mainly during the period of the British Mandate (1918-1948) fast urban growth incorporated a vivid land market, intense building activity and rising rents (Greicer, 1982), while major Jewish immigration waves arrived from Europe. However, thousands could not afford adequate housing within the city (Berger, 1998), and poor neighborhoods agglomerated and decayed adjacent to the municipal southern border with Jaffa (Rotbard, 2005) and in some clusters of shacks near the city center (Berger 1998; Hatuka, 2008).

Several municipal development plans were approved by the British officials and realized in affluent neighborhoods that kept on expanding to the north. At the same time, the armed conflict between Jews and Arabs escalated, and the Zionist establishment pursued land acquisitions for peripheral settlements and urban neighborhoods around the country (Greicer, 1982). Such organized activity was minor in Tel-Aviv, where the development coalition was mainly based on private investments and market (Hatuka and Forsyth 2005; Levine, 1998). Nevertheless, the local development coalition with national goals in mind elaborated the urban planes on the foreign settlement lands north and east of the city- Summeil el Masudiya, Jammasin el Gharbi, Ash Sheikh Muwannis (Arab) and Sarona (Templer) (Figure 1).

As shown by Mark Levine (1998) the urban development plans actually redefined the city boundaries by incorporating the village’s lands. Following Stone (1993), I will state here that these events reinforced the spatial strata of the city along the “fashionable direction”, and as such became the prominent practice of the coalition. In a gradual manner as it progressed north, each plan assured increasingly more spacious neighborhoods and presented feasible targets for the local development coalition activity in the acquisition of agricultural plots. In the 1940s, numerous individual re-division plans represented such deals made on Arab fields, orange groves and beach lots, followed by a major, centralized land acquisition (by the municipality and the Jewish National Fund) of vast lands belonging to the Templers in Sarona (Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1947). At the same time, the poor and slum areas, in Stone’s terms the local “complex targets”, decayed and were left out of the coalition’s scope of work.

Major gaps in residential and spatial quality between the areas were indicated in the official publications (Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1937; 1947), but a plan made for the southern areas set only designated clearance in some older neighborhoods, and transformation of other neighborhoods into industrial areas. In any case, most of the plans were put on the back burner until the declaration of the state in 1948 and the war that followed (Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1938-9; 1947; 1952).
Following the establishment of the state, a new and national land regime was established based on vast amounts of British Mandate governmental land and Arab absentee properties (Giladi and Golan, 2001; Golan 1999; 2001). In addition to its national political intention, it encouraged public land ownership and large public investment in order to meet the needs of the state’s welfare project (Giladi and Golan, 2001; Kark, 1993; Carmon, 1999; Werczberger and Borukhov, 1999; Kallus and Law-Yone, 2002; Kedar and Yiftachel, 2006).

An influx of destitute and impoverished immigrants doubled the population of Tel-Aviv. The municipal boundaries grew substantially due to built and vast vacant areas left behind by Palestinian residents of Jaffa and the surrounding villages which the state now controlled, in addition to the areas purchased previously (Figure 2). In the beginning, the built areas now deserted were managed like many others around the country in instances where there was an immediate need to find housing for the...
influx of immigrants (Golan, 1991; 1995; 2001; Carmon, 1999). Soon afterwards, a big wave of development was nationally initiated by the socialist government, based on the new land-regime, on modern planning modes, on the need to settle the new immigrants and on a governmental decision to centrally activate the housing market (Carmon, 1999; 2001; Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1962; Golan, 2001).

Figure 2: Tel-Aviv Municipality news (Yedioth Tel-Aviv) 1951 3-4): Town planning area 1949, the black area signals the built city. At this point only the north part of Jaffa was appointed to Tel-Aviv municipality.

Source: Tel-Aviv Municipal archive.

In Tel-Aviv the majority of municipal land was owned and managed by the city (25%) and the state (45%) (Alterman, 1997; Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1947; 1951). Both these institutions were the leading landholders, planners, authorizers and developers and even provided grants and loans to new residents through a variety of channels and to large populations (Carmon, 2001; Tel-Aviv municipality, 1950-1967; Kallus and Law-Yone, 2001). On these grounds, a new urban development coalition gathered which, unlike before, mainly cooperated with public development companies owned by the state, the political parties and the workers organization (Golan, 2001). This new and substantially different urban regime initiated
most of the building activity, but the old “fashionable direction” northward was maintained and even intensified.

The main reason for the above was the development feasibility of the northern additions to the city, where the built areas of the villages were tiny in comparison to the surrounding open spaces. Another reason was the well-established market trend towards the north, which brought the local development coalition to lobby against government intentions to build a separate town north of the Yarkon River (Golan, 2001). Once this battle was won, the area was quickly developed into suburbs, and the adjacent neighborhoods built according to the re-division plans of the 1940’s turned into affluent apartment houses (Golan, 1995; 2001; Hashimshoni, 1968).

There were larger built areas in the city of Jaffa and in the formerly Arab southern villages on the outskirts (Golan, 1991; 1995; 2001). Consequently, large new areas indicated for demolition and redevelopment were added to the old slums in the central and southern areas (Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1952; 1954; 1956; Horowitz, 1953). New neighborhoods were built nearby too, but the new fashionable large area of modern buildings in the north was the focus of urban wealth and growth. As a result, the small, private plots of what was once the "old" north went down a slippery slope opposite the “fashionable direction” along with the old central areas and towards the southern zones (Hashimshoni, 1968; Hatuka and Forsyth, 2005).

From now on, the "old city" was broken up with numerous privatizations of public lots and established institutions. A complex planning practice began: A general city plan was prepared depicting new perspectives for modern building by using the vast public owned lands (Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1954 8-9; Horowitz, 1953). At the same time a wide variety of spot-zoning privatization activities created business opportunities for a variety of establishment bodies and trade companies: large scale projects to clear and rebuild slum areas, enhancement of floor ratios attached to individual land plots, and the commercialization of plots of public buildings.

Paradoxically, the magnitude of planning and social equalizing opportunities for new public development under the new land regime (Werczberger and Borukhov, 1998; Yodfat 1969; Horowitz, 1953; Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1951-1956) resulted in frequent compromises to public interest. The agglomeration of the parallel activities created the urban skyline from the 1950s onward, which was affected by planning and privatization trends and thus intensified the “fashionable direction” in the direction created earlier. The next chapters will follow the general plans made and the spot zoning schemes that were realized in high-rise development deals. Information was gathered from the various Tel-Aviv/Tel-Aviv-Jaffa municipality zoning amendments of the years 1938-2001, as well as previous researches, official publications, newspaper articles, maps, photos and properties listings.
The First High-rise Building Cycle, 1953-1967

A high-rise building is defined as one that is two times or greater than the average building height (Haag Bletter, 1987). Most buildings in Tel-Aviv are 3-4 stories high. The first high-rises emerged during the first years of the newly established state and sprouted up at an increasing rate to become the first high-rise building cycle, climaxing in the mid 1960s. This cycle was less intense as the ones to come. However, from the outset, its planning practices signified the character of the Tel-Aviv high-rise phenomena.

Some buildings were 8-12 stories high and were designated for affluent housing in the northern areas of the city. Others were taller and were mostly designated for institutions, hotels and offices, located in various lots and locations throughout the “older” parts of the city. There was a set procedure (modus operandi) in the development of projects which provided the basis for what was to follow. Land managed or owned by public bodies was sold or leased to private contractors or institutional development companies, including vacant Arab and Templer vicinities, lots of old institutions and parks and old slums for the benefit of high-rise building developments (Figure 3).

Figure 3: A - High-rises completed in the central urban areas until 1967. B - Number of high-rises completed in the city until 1967.
Four years following the 1948 war, two office buildings built on lots belonging to the Jewish National Fund "disrupted" the local skyline with their eight massive buildings. One rose on the lot of the first Hebrew school—"Gymnasia Herzelia", a significant landmark from the early days of the establishment of the city, now designated to be re-built uptown near Summeil. This uptown location was also the site of the second high-rise which was built on the new and spacious campus of the workers union (the Histadrut), who was dominated by the governing national party "MAPAI". In the late 1950s, the first luxurious residential high-rise, relative to the period’s standard, was completed (Efrat, 2004). Uncharacteristically, the deal was made on private land, however it had the support of the Minister of Trade and Industry who claimed that the Super-sol (supermarket) that would occupy the ground level would greatly benefit the national economy. The first deal to clear slums in exchange for high floor-ratios, density and height came to fruition in 1961 (Berger, 1998). At the same time, few exclusive residential high-rise buildings were completed in the vacancies of the northern unoccupied Arab village of Sheikh Muwannis. All the above-mentioned early projects contained indications of operational routines to come and of the problems they would ultimately create.

Apart from such events, the city was mostly built with uniformity and in accordance with general plans from the 1930s and 1940s (Horowitz, 1953; Hashimshoni, 1968). In addition, any building deviating in height was planned separately and approved as a spot zoning alteration. This opened a door for special conditions and treatment given on an individual basis. From that point on such practice increased throughout the city, and was done even where numerous high-rises clustered together. In most cases, these local plans represented a procedure of land privatization, (by selling or by giving long-term leases).

In its official publication, the municipality justified privatization of its lands as imperative to the city’s budget: “the sale of municipal land through bidding to finance municipality development acts” (Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality, 1960, 58). At the same time, the government created the Israeli Lands Authority in the beginning of the 1960s to manage its properties as well as the Jewish National Fund and absentee landowners’ properties (Werczberger and Borukhov, 1998; Alterman, 1997). During this period, laws were legislated regarding state-managed land properties, which primarily dealt with leasing conditions and continuous taxation. In 1965, the Israeli Planning and Building Laws were legislated providing clear planning codes and regulations with a hierarchic planning system (Alfasi, 2006; Alfasi and Portugali, 2004). Nevertheless, the privatization spot-zoning acts of high-rise projects continue regardless of the city’s general plans.

High-rises of the period also served a need for national representation aimed at the global economy. Two more “Super-sol” high-rises were thus erected along with high-rises for leading national companies. Consequently, the city lost some of the most valuable public properties: the popular performance hall (“Beit Ha-am”-home of the people) was replaced by a high-rise for the national airline. A Hilton Hotel
replaced a large park on a seaside cliff, with the coordination of Israeli Government officials and the American hotel company (Elon, 1962). An enormous development project involved the final demolition of "Gymnasia Herzelia" and in its place sprung the “Shalom Tower,” which remained the tallest in the Middle East for years (34 floors). A complex deal was struck: the developer would lease the land from the city and the Jewish National Fund to build a colossal commercial high-rise. The public gained revenues, a new road under the building, and some space for public and military use. The developers of the Shalom Tower also built the new City Hall at their own expense (Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality, 1963) which replaced an additional public institution: the public swimming pool for the city’s children.

During the 1960’s a general outline plan for the city was developed, however, it was not approved by the municipal board. At the same time, large scale privatization initiatives were promoted for massive development in selected vacant and slum areas (Hatuka and Kallus, 2006; Berger, 1998) and new high-rise neighborhoods in the north etc. Thus, although the general character of the urban and national regime at the time was similar to what regime theorist’s coined "directive" (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983), ultimately the high-rise deals and plans pursued obvious entrepreneurial coalition activity. This activity involved the main property holders and keepers of the time: official bodies on both a national and municipal level, institutional and semi institutional building companies and a few private local contractors. The vast land assets now managed by the state and the municipality were the foundation for most deals. It is interesting to note that privatization, the focus of activity, was pursued both in the large "new areas" and in locations throughout the older neighborhoods of the city.

Thus, damage to public interest occurred on numerous levels. Older neighborhoods were ecologically and socially disturbed while new commercial high-rise buildings replaced institutions and parks, shadowed the narrow streets and clogged the road system. The coalition developed expansive affluent neighborhoods to the north, with a clear emphasis on exclusive high-rise building and higher standard surroundings, as compared to the standard of development of the southern and central areas. The young and affluent enjoyed state-supported housing and flocked to the northern neighborhoods, further causing the decline of the older areas (Hashimshony, 1968; Tel-Aviv municipality, 1971). At the same time, the general municipal plans for the southern areas as well as the government action plans for the improvement of the poorer neighborhoods had little impact until 1967 (Carmon, 1999).

The Second High-rise Building Cycle, 1968-1977

The end of a deep recession that preceded the war in 1967 marked the beginning of a new high-rise building cycle. As in previous years, most high-rise building projects were based on deals initiated by state and municipal officials. However, the new cycle rose much higher and took place throughout most of city areas. The
Public Assets vs. Public Interest: High-rise Building in Tel Aviv-Jaffa

The building boom peaked in 1975 and fell sharply towards the end of the decade following the disintegrating Labor Party government and its ultimate defeat in the 1977 elections.

The primary events at the time included a continuous state of war from 1969-70, an influx of immigrants from the USSR along with internal social unrest in 1971. Large welfare and urban regeneration projects were promoted by the local and national ‘concessionary regime’, and later decreased after the October War and the international oil crisis in 1973. From this point onward, the Israeli economy joined the global recession with rising inflation (Giladi, 1998). However, the impact of these events on the high-rise building model was partial, while growing investment in the local growth economy intensified the acknowledged planning practices. Together with a significant increase in tourism, substantial government housing subsidies (Carmon, 2001) and a late implementation of redevelopment plans made before 1967, the cycle climaxed in 1975 and signified some new intensifications of the local practice to be followed in the next cycles.

The increased building activity intensified privatization of public spaces and publicly managed/owned lands for redevelopment into commercial towers or residential luxury high-rises, while the amount of high-rise development on private land remained comparatively low (Figure 4). The planning practices defined in the previous cycle evolved and reached a new magnitude, however, just as in the past, each initiative had its own conditions and requirements. More high-rise deals were made around the city by privatizing various public lots, both adjacent to previous projects and in new locations (Figure 4B). This practice was most intriguing during this period, since it involved large concessionary activity by the local regime. A substantial part of the high-rise building was now dedicated to urban renewal projects in slum areas. However, the manner in which this was done only intensified the gap between socio-economic groups and further compromised public interest.

The old slums in the city center location, (named Mahlul Aleph) where homeless laborers resided for decades, were cleared from municipal-owned beaches. The city initiated a deal to finance the operation by authorizing extensive and generous high-density building rights to the commercial developers (Hatuka, 2008; Elhanani 1965; Vinkler, 1971; Erlik, 1975). This case pre-empted Fainstein’s (1991) observation on the 1980’s planning practices, and clearly represents entrepreneurial activity which traded regulations governing density, light, and air with floor ratios, to provide the needs and ambitions of the local regime. A crowded strip of hotels was erected, and has since blocked the beach from the city, causing substantial environmental obstruction. Other deals were made involving the privatization of empty municipal
lots; however, no guidelines were followed for the purpose of equalizing development standards or balancing the revenues between sites. In this way, the spot-zoning acts where used separately by the local regime, protected or enhanced the public budget, and at the same time exacerbated the inequality between locations.

An additional example of these practices which brought about even worse results was the case of the redevelopment of Salame (now Kfar Shalem), a large Arab village deserted in 1948 which was since inhabited by Jews in individual houses (Golan, 1991). The village was located in the southeastern part of the city, and was designated for slum clearance in municipal and government publications. The plan was to evacuate the residents, completely demolish and clear the area and in its place build residential high-rises with a great number of small apartments. A third of the apartments were earmarked to house the evacuees, and the rest were to be sold in order to finance the project itself: evacuation, redevelopment and subsidies to poor families (Carmon, 1999; Yevin, 1990).

Figure 4: A - High-rises completed in the central urban areas until 1977.
B - Number of high-rises completed in the city until 1977.

The operation model used in this particular location followed previous Western urban renewal projects (Carmon, 1999), with one critical deviation: while Western municipalities and governments purchased slum areas to assure redevelopment, in this case, publicly-owned and managed land was privatized and subdivided. The
responsibility for evacuation and re-housing was either outsourced or delegated to semi-establishment or private development companies. To finance the project, exceptionally high density building was authorized, three times the accepted norm for newly built neighborhoods of the day (Hashimshony, 1968; Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2000) completely ignoring the fact that the apartments were meant to house comparatively large families. Within a few years, the building was halted due to public outcry and lack of local support on the ground.

The failure of the initiative was also attributed to the complete lack of consideration shown toward the needs of the local residents (Carmon, 1999). It is obvious that in Tel-Aviv, the advantage of the public land ownership was not seized as an opportunity to equalize profits and needs between projects and social groups. This claim is based on a comparison with large public initiatives promoted at the same time which created a new neighborhood with spacious surroundings in the north that soon became the most desired by young, affluent families (Birenbaum–Carmeli, 2000).

In the cases mentioned, the development coalition maintained its composition and practices of the previous cycle, and reached new magnitude of development. The same was evident in plans realized for residential luxurious high-rise clusters. Towards the end of the cycle, few clusters of exclusive high-rises of higher standard were realized in the new and affluent areas to the north (previously the vicinities of Sarona and Jammashin). The greatest magnitude of luxury and size was reached in a cluster named ‘King David Towers’, built by the development company of the Workers Union (Histadrut), on lots owned by the Jewish National Fund. The site was previously designated for public usage and the plan maintained some open public space between the nine seventeen-story towers. However, the cluster was designed as a large gated enclave, with private sport facilities, swimming pool and garden.

The Third High-rise Building Cycle 1978-1988

Luxurious neighborhoods and clusters solidified planning and development practices into a clear standard during the third period, and served as a mechanism for the perpetuation of the coalition into this new structural and political era. At the same time, the few large-scale initiatives to rehabilitate the southeastern areas of the city came to an almost complete stop, and overall governmental building activity in the city decreased (Carmon, 1999; Yevin, 1990).

The above did not mean a full decline in the state’s concessionary activity. In the early 1980’s the new conservative government kept and even increased the support to poor and decayed neighborhoods, however the construction activity was mainly focused on renovations (Carmon, 1999). Within a few years, a withdrawal began in government housing for young couples, new immigrants and poor families (Carmon, 2001). Thus, the general building cycle in the country during the following decade was low and indecisive. In Tel-Aviv, one can clearly see a significant reduction of
project completions when comparing the number to the previous high-rise cycle, yet taller and more luxurious buildings were being built at the same time.

Adopting the Western models of the time, the local development coalition incorporated more members and investments from the private sector. However, it is evident that the local planning practices further strengthened the privatization and entrepreneurial practices of the past. As Fainstein indicated (Fainstein, 1991) when observing the same period in New York and London, the most tangible evidence of the shift in planning mode was in the planning rhetoric that clearly relied upon non-governmental capital. The dominance of entrepreneurial privatization acts was now justified by pointing out the failures of large redevelopment and slum clearance projects (Carmon, 1999; Yevin, 1990), new market conditions, and the need to further revitalize the city center (Gripel, 1983; Mazor, 1979; 1984; Carmon 1999; Carmon and Erez, 1996; Schnell and Greicer, 1994; Hasson and Hazan, 1997; Monterescu and Fabian, 2003). In this way, added components to privatization deals that unmistakably targeted the affluent market, adjusted the old practices to the global shifts.

The condition of the national market at the time was another important factor in the manner in which planning practices were conducted. A sharp reduction in neighborhood development and residential housing projects was evident from the early 1980s as the economy took a downward spin. By the end of 1983, bank stocks collapsed and along with their nationalization came an increase in the national deficit. In 1984 the inflation rate reached triple digits (Giladi, 1998). Building development projects further decreased and the little there was focused on the affluent sector whose purchasing power was little affected and who considered real estate a relatively good investment thus the market was believed safe (Giladi, 1998; Schnell and Greicer, 1994).

Ironically, Tel-Aviv luxury high-rises were further strengthened due to the fruition of a general planning outline that was put forth in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which strongly assessed the need to support, preserve and restore the older and central neighborhoods (Gripel, 1983; Mazor, 1979, 1984; Schnell and Greicer, 1994; Yoscovitch 1997; Hatuka and Forsyth, 2005). The plan did not receive legal validity; however, for the first time since the establishment of the state, it expressed the promotion and encouragement of residential living in older neighborhoods of the city’s privately held properties. The plan indicated the influence of post-modern Western ideas in urban design, binding gentrification and regeneration in areas where there were structures with significant architectural and historical qualities. However, in the approach of local planning conventions, the general plan was broken down into numerous planning initiatives. Some continued to strengthen the previous planning practices of high-rise building in all its major parameters: the luxury high-rises in the north increased, not heeding the warnings of the general plan of increasing the strength of peripheral northern neighborhoods. Selected high-rises in the city center created clear gentrification focal points which were meant to strengthen the
residential areas, though in reality, did not meet the needs of young and middle class families (Schnell and Greicer, 1994), as required in the general plan. From the outset, preservation was privatized and tied in to high-rise development deals thus sporadically damaging the historic urban fabric (Hatuka and Forsyth, 2005).

In light of the problems that arose in the West regarding the overall planning practices failures of the modernistic approach (Alfasi and Portugali, 2004; Alfasi, 2006), these conventional local planning practices of spot-zoning received new legitimacy. On the other hand, although the new planning deals remained similar in essence, they elaborated upon their predecessors and gained some tangible public benefits. For example, towers were planned by the city on half of a municipal lot, using high building rights calculated of the entire property. The other half was designated as an outdoor garden, which would be financed by the developer who won the bid. In this manner, these projects were presented as beneficial to the public to a greater extent than in previous cycles (Yoscovitch, 1997). However, the enhanced practices also resulted in the increased dependence of the municipality on partnerships with high-rise contractors, for the widening of roads, building restoration, parking and parks (Alterman, 1990; Razin, 2004; Hasson and Hazan, 1997; Nachmias, 1997) as well as slum clearance in central locations.

Thus, the urban regime of the time seems to be transitional, since it clearly maintained a strong attachment with old members and practices, while incorporating new methods of privatization and more members from the private sector. Various deals and high-rise types were realized around town, however as before, most towers were built on publicly owned lots, some of which was designated for public use and mostly in the same areas (Figure 5A). On the one hand, the new deals seemed to be more considerate to public interest and translated growing professional awareness of inner city needs into some tangible public benefits. Meanwhile, the main compromises intensified: public fix assets were privatized uptown to create larger wealthy enclaves, while the southern projects declined (Figure 5B). Each deal was elaborated separately and zoning plans gained more legitimacy while the general application remained obscured from the public. The municipality’s conventional dependency on various privatization acts grew to new magnitudes, and thus its dependency on high-rise luxurious deals became substantial in city life.

The above holds strong reminiscence to Fainstein’s criticism (1991) of the current entrepreneurial planning practice. It is my contention that the local magnitude of the practical attachment “to the logic of the bottom line” (Fainstein, 1991, 31) was rooted in the perpetuation of local historic practices which were presently on the rise. Furthermore, since planning was still strongly attached to the feasibilities and the needs of the local land regime, the old compromising methods evolved to meet new ambitions, aspirations and limits.
The Fourth High-rise Building Cycle 1989-2001 and Some Years Later

Following the years of reorganization, the fourth building cycle was bigger and more intensive than all its previous ones. Taller and more frequent high-rises were built than in the past. Additional planning and development tactics were adopted from the West along with the global high-rise style. The promising political environment due to the Oslo Accords and the success of the local hi-tech industry resulted in a strong inclination towards the global market and attracted foreign investments.

As some scholars indicated, the local private sector’s position within the development coalition became substantial (Carmon, 1999; 2001; Monterescu and Fabian, 2003; Alfasi and Fabian; 2008; Hatuka and Forsyth, 2005; Alterman, 2003). At the same time, the continuity of the previous compromising mode of operation and its progressive enhancement is evident with every stage of the cycle. In geographic terms, high-rises strengthened previous hubs or spread to new locations as before; in practical terms, using added privatization methods focused on luxury housing and business towers along with increasing unregulated, individual and sporadic planning acts.
The cycle began with a large governmental initiative (on a national scale) to build neighborhoods in order to house the enormous number of immigrants that arrived from the former Soviet Union (Carmon, 2001). By 1995, these types of initiatives subsided, however, large-scale privatization continued and resulted in higher luxury towers, until its fall at the end of the decade. Throughout this period and in the years that followed, the increasing influence of private factors within the coalition was impacted by the city's ambition to enhance and revitalize the historic city-center and the preservation of its buildings (Hatuka and Forsyth, 2005; Alfasi and Fabian, 2009). Similar deals were put together for the purpose of improving infrastructure and public spaces. In this manner, municipal "addiction" to deals that added floors in high-rise buildings resulted in a more massive and pronounced high-rise presence and it became crucial for the city's infrastructural development plans (Yoscovitch, 1997).

In effect, high-rise building continued to contribute to the city coffers along with the national budget, whether directly through the privatization process or through high taxation for the extra building permits. As before, separate and individual deals were made for each location. The locations of these developments had high potential for gentrification, whereas large areas south of the “fashionable direction” remained stagnant and without any rehabilitating involvement (Hatuka, 2008; Rotbard, 2005; Monterescu and Fabian, 2003).

Organizational changes in the local land- regime (Alterman, 2003) and the privatization of all the institutional (and semi institutional) development companies were also manifested in the escalation of privatization initiatives on public-owned lands that were scattered throughout the city. As a result, high-rise projects continued to be greatly scattered, nonfunctional and damaging to the environment in numerous areas. Exclusive residential high-rises continued being built in the north next to others built before, however, now initiatives did so over broader areas in the north and central areas. The same happened with office high-rises that were built in the newly designated CBD area (Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality, 1993, 2003; Hatuka and Forsyth, 2005) as well as other locations. The coalition was now focused on flagship projects, resulting in increased islands of extraordinary wealth, burdening their surroundings with traffic and blocking sunlight.

Scattered initiatives on public-owned (and sometimes on public facility) lands included a trade tower that was built on the area of a municipal/national hospital, three office towers were added to an isolated business center (planned in the 1960s) located in a historic, coastal Arab neighborhood of Manshia. Individual towers replaced areas meant for public purposes in the eastern part of the city along with the old opera house to the West. On the area of the former Arab village of Jammasin el Gharbi (now called Givat Amal) homes were cleared and the project was financed by the development of two big clusters of luxury high towers (34-50 stories), built adjacent to shorter ones built from the 1960s on (Figures 6A and 6B).

The more prominent projects of the period involved more intricate and complex
deals, some of which included tangible public benefit. Two luxury towers that replaced an old market financed a public square on top of semi public underground parking, a lot used for municipal facilities was long leased to a developer who built a huge project of high-rises on top of a commercial center and in return, the developer financed a large interchange nearby (Hasson and Hazan, 1997). Recently, community involvement and preservation activists succeeded in achieving public gains with stubborn persistence: the Templer settlement of Sarona, located in the city center, was cleared of government offices and preserved within a large park area right in the middle of high-rise office buildings. Another large-scale authorized project will clear and replace a wholesale municipal market with residential luxury high-rises that will include a public building and a park.

Figure 6: A - High-rises completed in the central urban areas until 2005.  
B - Numbers of high-rises completed in the city until 2005.

As Fainstein claimed (Fainstein, 1991), these local planning deals and practices reflect pragmatic and realistic attitudes of a free market economy that ultimately narrows the planning activity to the capitalistic luxury market. The hazards to the public interest, as elaborated in regards to the previous cycles gained more magnitude, as the entrepreneurial local regime stabilized. Nevertheless, the specifications of the local compromises point directly to the local composition of assets, impli-
cating privatization and spot-zoning as the prominent method of the land regime within the urban regime.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The historic scenario laid above is twofold; the four building-cycles present escalation in the number of high-rise building and building size, as well as private market role in the development regime. However, the practices in the last cycle were mainly laid down in the first cycle. Clear continuity was found in methods of privatization and planning, in the development’s spatial directions, the market trends and the compromises made to public interests.

The local planning practice evolved while facing few major historical turns, but the resulted practice generally enhanced the previous one’s magnitude. In this manner, the local case features Stone’s theory, as the coalition formed and changed while addressing its potential for change and at the same time establishing a pattern of interaction and resources that "has substantial staying power" (Stone, 1993,14). In this way, the national land regime created in the 1950s stretched the "fashionable direction" of the city’s early development, while the practice of planning each urban area individually evolved into a seemingly random spot zoning. The spread of land privatization acts, governmental housing projects and slum clearance projects in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s laid the grounds for flashy intense development projects in the post-Keynesian era. In a similar manner to what Elkin (1987) found in Dallas, the expansion in public awareness did not remove the link held in this practice between public officials and business leaders. On the other hand, this awareness as well as the new planning practices as Fainstein (1991) described brought some change; early and bold compromises to public interest in middle-sized projects laid the grounds for later and more subtle ones, made in extra-large projects. The financial success of the luxurious line of high-rise projects set the local regime practice while evolving and adapting to current Western entrepreneurial terms.

This continuity was associated to the dominance of authorities’ fix-assets in the local urban regime and their wide spatial spread; authority’s budgetary concerns (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983), as well as regime’s maintenance dependency on "getting things done" (Stone, 1987; 1989; 1993) encouraged enhancements of such assets in affluent areas and/or privatization acts. The other side of this practice meant that complex targets in the southern poor areas were postponed, and the deal making limited the democratic practice in city life. As I stressed earlier, these phenomena were noted by regime scholars elsewhere (Harvey, 1989; 1990; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Fainstein, 1991; Stone, 1993; Elkin, 1987). The local variant meant that numerous designated public spaces and institutions were privatized, environmental assets were blocked and very few public gains were considered. In addition, regulations governing density, light, view and air (Fainstein, 1991) were traded
in numerous sites to finance authority’s projects (building preservation, slums clearance, infrastructure and revenues) long before the current era.

To fully understand this long-term consistency of such compromising practice, I will return to Jessop (1990; 1997) and suggest conceiving the process described above as a product of the local early land-regime’s economic domination, which developed to become economic hegemony. This strategy maintained general acceptance by advancing “the immediate interests” of wide social groups, while securing “the long term interests of the hegemonic fractions” (Jessop, 1990, 199). My claim is that it does not seem reasonable to assume that such general acceptance was due to the minor public gains secured in some luxurious project, as well as to general taxation. Instead, I argue that the hegemonic strategy was maintained in Tel-Aviv by established equating of public interest to public funds, on behalf of public fix-assets and consistent spatial planning. As such, this economic ‘growth model’ is "compatible with its various extra-economic preconditions and also outlines a general strategy appropriate to its realization” (Jessop, 1990, 198). For a long time, the planning practice was adjusted to the evolution of ‘historic block’ and to the hegemonic elite’s changing aspirations, while at the same time legitimized itself by addressing the need of the public for capital.

The main practice in the service of this convention was spot-zoning (or local planning amendments) that did not allow for public comprehension of the development by advancing numerous events across town. Indeed, while efficiently enhancing and/or guarding capital accumulation, the particulars of budgeting, taxation and revenues were opaque, as well as the overall planning ideas. This planning method was described by scholars as a practice that erodes the basis of the planning system while policy is being formed by individual decisions (Alfasi, 2006; Booth, 1996). Cullingworth (1993, 49) claimed that spot-zonings singles out "a piece of property for preferential treatment” and thus considered it as a legal invalidity.

Scholars attribute this practice to the current era, as one of the reactions to the hierarchic-modernistic planning rigidity (Cullingworth, 1993). This is also one of the explanations given in Israel for the local ascendance of this phenomenon over long-term comprehensive plans (Alfasi and Portugali, 2004), that lagged behind governmental development initiatives (Alexander et. al., 1983; Alterman, 2001; Alterman and Hill, 1986; Gertel and Law-Yone, 1991). Other explanations attribute the local issue to an informal political culture (Alfasi, 2006) to a continuous sense of crisis (Alfasi and Portugali, 2004; Atkin and Dror, 1966; Hill, 1986), or to uncoordinated governmental initiatives (Alterman and Hill, 1986). My concluding remark here is that spot zoning should be considered as a systemic practice, that efficiently serves capital accumulation, and that this claim is relevant wherever the regulative system blends with the initiatory system in an entrepreneurial regime. Accordingly, the hazards of such practice to public interests are not singularly related to any structural mode, but reflect local resources, regime conventions and social legitimating which accumulate them in successive times.
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NOTES

1. The public bodies are mainly the Jewish National Fund and the Development Authority for Absentees Properties. Due to a large land acquisition of the Templer colony Sarona in the 1940s, Tel-Aviv municipality is also a major landholder of 25% of the municipal land, while the state manages 45% of the municipal land.

2. According to some early state's laws, land is rarely sold and in most cases, developers or residents acquire leases permitting them to develop and use the land and to sell these rights under special conditions (Golan, 1999; Katz, 2000; Werczberger and Borukhov, 1999). Werczberger and Borukhov (1999) showed that similar states exist in Singapore, Hong Kong and Canberra.

3. The main expansion plan was Tel-Aviv town planning scheme no. 58, originally planned by Patrick Geddes in 1926 and later approved in 1938. In 1941 an additional expansion was approved following town planning scheme no. 50 (Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1937; 1938-1939; 1943).

4. Tel-Aviv town planning ordinance no. 44, was legally approved in 1941 and related to the central and southern areas, all built before the first major expansion (Tel-Aviv Municipality, 1937-1938).

5. The government was led by the MAPAI, lit.- Land of Israel Workers’ Party and the first Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. This labor Zionist movement was historically connected to the Histadrut Union, which dominated the Hebrew settlement economy and infrastructure during the time of the British Mandate.

6. Land selling was limited during the 1950s to limited urban areas, in an act meant by the government to encourage development and the local economy. Most of the privatization acts were made from this point on by long time leasing (Katz, 2000; Alterman, 1997; 2003).

7. The letter was sent by the minister Pinchas Sapir to the city engineer, and accepted in 4.8.1957.

8. Town Planning Amendment no. 44, no. 58, no. 50.

9. First master plan (the Horowitz plan) was issued in 1953-54, second master plan (Hashimshoni plan) was prepared as zoning amendments during the mid 1960s.
10. The main neighborhood in this framework was called Neve Avivim, where a group of luxurious high-rises was realized as early as 1965, following a large land privatization to a large local building company named “Neve”.


12. The Mazor plan, prepared by the architect Adam Mazor and the Institute of Urban Studies, was presented to the city council in 1984.

13. In Israel, the taxation on capital gains equals half the value of the building ratio’s enhancement. For the high-rises described here, most building rights were doubled or more as compared to the original city plans, and since the 1990s, the authority’s policy is that half of the tax is allocated to public benefits (Alterman, 1990; 1997; Yoskovitch, 1997).

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